WILLIAMSON vi. JONES.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Tn the Olarksville Chancery Court, Tennessee.
AMANDA WILLIAMSON,

et al., BY CYRUS WINSTON, THEIR NEXT

FRIEND, VS. M. P. JONES.
The amended constitution of Tennessee. by which slavery is declared abolished
throughout the §tate, is a valid instrument, and all persons in the state, claimed
as slaves, are thereby made free.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHACKLEFORD, Chancellor.-In this cause the parties are before the court by writ of haheas corpus. It appears from the
proof that the petitioners are reputed children of Cyrus Winston,
a negro and a freed man, that they are under the age of twentyone years, and have filed this petition by Cyrus Winston to be
discharged from bondage in which they are now held.
It appears from the proof that Thomas Williamson, a citizen of.
Robertson county, Tennessee, died some years ago, leaving a
widow (Tabitha Williamson), who has continued to reside on the
farm to the present time. Upon his death the trustees of the
estate took possession of the property, consisting of real estate
and the slaves (some thirty or forty in number), among which
were the petitioners. It appears that the mother of the petitioners
was the property of the said Thomas Williamson. 'It further
appears from the proof that M. P. Jones, as the agent of the trustees of Thomas Williamson, deceased, held the petitioners as the
property of the estate. It also appears from his answer to the
writ that he held them as slaves, and was not aware of any law
by which they were freed, and that he refused to deliver them to
the reputed father when demand was made for them-claiming
them as property of the estate, and that they were in his possession on the 22d of February 1865, in the county of Robertson,
state of Tennessee.
The facts presented in this record raise the questions as to the
validity of the amendments of the constitution adopted by the
people of the state of Tennessee on the 22d of February 1865,
which were, "1st. That slavery should be forever abolished in
the state of Tennessee. 2d. That the legislature of the state of
Tennessee should pass no laws recognising property in man."
When the state of Tennessee was admitted into the federal

WILLIAMSON

Ts.

JONES.

union, slavery was recognised by the constitution of the state,
and from that time to the 22d February 1865, the right to hold
property in slaves in the state was never questioned. Laws regulating and controlling the institution were passed at different times
by the legislature; they were bought and sold, the subject of levy
and sale, by execution, for the payment of debts, and upon thedeath of the owner they descended and vested in his heirs. The
master had a right to inflict punishment that did not extend to
life or limb-unconditional submission on the part- of the slave
to the will of the master, was the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. Such was the- status of slavery until
the rebellion was inaugurated. Upon the occupation of Tennessee
by the federal forces, many of the slaves fled to their lines for
freedom, and the officers were forbid by law from returning them
to their owners-hence the institution became greatly demoralized.
The discipline necessary for their control and government could
not be enforced, and they ceased to be of much value.
By the rebellion, the state laws were suspended, the courts of
the country were closed, the governor fled, taking the archives
of the state with him, the officers of the state government refused
to act, and the laws could not be enforced; private rights were
totally disregarded, while robberies, murder, and high crimes Were
daily occurrences throughout the state, until men stood appalled
at the consequences growing out of the rebellion. The Gulf
States, influenced and controlled by the action of their politicians,
had passed ordinances of secession in violation of the constitution
of the United States, and endeavored to throw off their allegiance
to the government. For their protection and security it was
necessary that Tennessee and the other border states should be
carried into the rebellion with them, and in an evil hour, the people, wooed and maddened to frenzy, voted in favor of a separation
from the" Federal Government, in direct violation of the constitution
of the United States.
The consequence of that action there is now to be seen in every
county, dismal anarchy overspreading the land. In this condition
of things the loyal men of the country believed they had a right
to remedy the evils under article 1, " Declaration of Rights," section 1, of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee, which are
as follows:"That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are formed on their authority and instituted for their peace,
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safety, and happiness. For the advancement of these ends, they
have at all times an indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish
the government in such manner as they may think proper."
According to the provisions of this section, the people have the
right to make such changes in the constitution of the state as the
necessities of the times may demand, provided that those changes
do not conflict with the constitution of the United States, which
is the paramount law of the land.
Under this section of the bill of rights, a convention was called
by the people, to meet at Nashville on the 19th of January 1865.
Primary meetings were held in a majority of the counties, and
delegates were chosen to that convention, and more than five hundred people met in the convention at Nashville, and the amendments aforesaid were submitted to the people of that state for
their action on the 22d of February 1865; also, a proposition to
elect a governor and legislature, by which the powers of the state
could be vitalized, and the functions of the government restored
to their original status. The loyal men of the state, holding the
doctrine that the status of the state in the Federal Union could
not be broken up or changed, that all that was necessary to vitalize the state was to fill all the offices of the state which had been
abandoned by their former incumbents, and start the machinery
of government. On the 22d of February 1865, an election was
held in a majority of the counties, and in every county not held
by the public enemies of the country, votes were cast on the
propositions submitted, and a large majority of the votes cast on
that day were in favor of the adoption of the amendment proposed, as appeared from the proclamation of the military governor of the state. An election for governor and for members of
the legislature was held on the 4th of March thereafter. The
power exercised by the people under this section is not without
precedent. The constitution of the state of Michigan was adopted
by a convention formed by members, as chosen in primary meetings and submitted to the people, and met the approval of the
Senate of the United States, and she was admitted as a state in
the union.
The genius of the Anglo-Saxon race was exemplified in this
move of the people. Wherever they have existed as a nation,
their efforts have ever been to have laws and a constitution for
their government, and protection of life, liberty, and property.
And can it be for a moment believed that the people of the state
I
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had not the right to meet in convention and submit propositions
to be voted for by them which would give protection to life, liberty,
and property ?
These amendments, having been adopted by the people of the
state of Tennessee on the 22d of Eebruary 1865, they have become a part of the constitution of the state, and slavery or involuntary servitude within the limits of the state ceased to exist,
except as a punishment for crime. The shackles which had so
long bound the slave and his ancestors, fell from him, and he
stood forth a free man, entitled to all the rights and privileges
of free persons of color. He can no longer be bought and sold ;
husband and wife, parent and child, can no longer be separated
by the will of the master.
Cyrus, the father, has a natural right to the care and. custody
of his children, the petitioners, and, as such, had the right in the
courts of Tennessee, to present the petition in their behalf against
canr one who held them in custody By the laws of Tennessee,
courts are opened to freed negroes to sue and be sued, for the
collection of debts, or the redress of injuries. They have the
same right to the protection of the laws as white men.
By section 3808 of the Code of Tennessee, "ca negro, mulatto,
Indian, or person of mixed blood, descended from negro or Indian
ancestors to the third generation, inclusive, though one ancestor
of each generation may have been a white person, whether bond
or free, is incapable of being a witness in any cause, civil or
criminal, except for or against each other," and in this cause,
the motion of the petitioners' attorney to introduce Cyrus Winston, the reputed father of the petitioners, as a witness, is refused,
he.being a negro and the defendant a white man.
The petitioners will be discharged and set at liberty from the
custody of the defendant, M. P. Jones, or any person claiming
the right to them, and permitted to go hence as free persons of
color. A decree will be entered in pursuance of the principle
of this opinion, and the defendant, M. P. Jones, be taxed with
the cost in this cause.
The opinion was rendered at the by that instrument declared to be free,
April Term 1865. Being the first de- we deem it for that, if for no other
cision involving the legitimacy of the reason, deserving of more than a passnew constitution of Tennessee, and, ing notice. It presents an impressive
consequently the status of the persons picture of the anarchy attendant upon
lately held by its citizens as slaves, but the great crime of secession, and of the
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evils which led to, perhaps compelled,
the movement for the reconstruction of
a loyal government in Tennessee.
It is not our purpose to criticise the
conclusion at which the court arrived.
The decree, so far as the constitutional
question was concerned, must have been
what it was, that the petitioners were
entitled, under the fundamental law of
Tennessee, to their freedom, and that
they should be discharged. But, while
this is true, it is far from clear, that
the grounds upon which the decision
was rested by the court were either
solid or safe. We are confident they
were neither the one nor the other.
As the limits of a note, however, will
not permit a complete exposition of the
reasons for these views, we shall confine ourselves to a bare allusion to such
of them as are most important.
I. A court, under a written constitution, framed and construed as are those
of the Union and of the states composing it, has no discretion in regard to
recognising that constitution as both
legitimate and, within its proper limits,
supreme. Deriving its existence and
authority from that instrument alone,
a court would be guilty of self-stultification, of suicide, to deny to it the
validity which it claims. It would be
just as reasonable for the judges to
refuse to move around the sun with the
earth, to which the force of gravity had
pinned them.
This position was distinctly affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
in certain cases growing out of what is
called Dorr's Rebellion, in 1842-3, and
was afterwards approved by the Supreme Court of the United States, in a
case originating. in the same disturbances. The Rhode Island court had
been elected and commissioned under
what is now considered the legitimate
constitution of the state, the old charter
of, Charles IL, and the trials were of
persons engaged in attempts to estab-

lish an antagonistic constitution, framed
without the consent of the existing government, and in defiance of it, by
persons, a large number of whom were
not voters under existing laws, who
styled themselves "the people's party."
The persons prosecuted offered evidence tending to show, that. "the peopie's constitution," as it was called,
was legitimate and had superseded that
under which the court was constituted
and sitting. This evidence was rejected
by the court, upon grounds which, as
we have not access to the reported opinions, we give as stated by Chief Justice
TA EY in a subsequent case in the
Supreme Court of the United States, as
follows :-He said: "In Rhode Island,
the question has been directly decided.
Prosecutions were there instituted
against some of the persons who had
been active in the forcible opposition
to the old government. And in more
than one of the cases, evidence was
offered in the Circuit Court for the
same purpose; that is, for the purpose
of showing that the proposed constitution had been adopted by the people
of Rhode Island, and had, therefore,
become the established government,
and consequently that the parties accused were doing nothing more than
their duty in endeavoring to support it.
But the courts uniformly held, that the
inquiry proposed to be made belonged
to the political power, and not to the
judicial; that it rested with the political power to decide whether the charter government had been displaced or
not; and when that decision was made,
the judicial department would be bound
to take notice of it as the paramount
law of the state, without the aid of oral
evidence or the examination of witnesses; that, according to the laws and
institutions of Rhode Island, no such
change had been recognised by the
political power; and that the charter
government was the lawful and estab-
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lished government of the state during
the period in contest, and that those
who were in arms against it were insurgents, and liable to punishment:"
Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. 1 (39). After
citing the decisions of the Rhode Island
courts, as above, the Chief Justice added:
-"
Indeed, we do not see how the question could be tried and judicially decided in a state court. Judicial power
presupposes an established government
capable of enacting laws and enforcing
their execution, and of appointing
judges to expound and administer
them. The acceptance of the judicial
office is a recognition of the authority
of that government from which it is
derived. And if the authority of that
government is annulled and overthrown,
the power of its courts and other officers
is annulled with it. And if a state
court should enter upon the inquiry
'proposed in this case, and should come
to the conclusion that the government
under which it acted had been put
aside and displaced by an opposing
government, it would cease to be a
court,.and be incapable of pronouncing
a judicial decision upon the question
it undertook to try. If it decideb at
all, ac a court, it necessarily affirms
the existence and authority of the government under which it is exercising
judicial power :" Ibid. With the case
of Luther vs. Borden, compare Scott e
aL vs. Detroit Y. M. S.'s Lessees, 1
Doug. (Mich.) R. 119; Scott Vs.Jones's
Lessees, 5 How. 343.
The principle of these cases obviously
would have required the judicial department established under the Dorr
Constitution to decide, that that instrument alone was the legitimate one, had
similar cases come before it for trial.
It is clear, then, that the ne* constitution of Tennessee, after having been
recognised by the 1oliticol power as the
only state constitution in existence, and
as valid, must have received the recog-

nition of the court in the case considered. As was intimated by Judge
TANEY, any decision by it which should
have declared the constitution, under
which it was sitting, illegitimate, would
have been an act of folly, since it would,
at the same time, have been an admission, that the court had no power whatever to pass judicially upon the question
of its legitimacy.
II. When attention is directed, on
the other hand, to the grounds upon
which the court based its decision, it
is impossible, in our view, to withhold
dissent.
After citing the first section of the
Tennessee Bill of Rights, affirming the
right of the people "at all times * * to
alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they may
think proper," the Chancellor says:"'According to the provisions of this
section, the people have the right to
make such changes in the constitution
of the state as the necessities of the
times may demand, provided that those
changes do not conflictwith the constitution of the Uhited States, which is
the paramount law of the land." The
last clause of this extract obviously
contemplates the right described as
being a constitutional or legal one, for
otherwise the restriction of its exercise
within the limits imposed by the federal
constitution, would be inconsistent.
The opinion then proceeds to recount
the steps by which the people of Tennessee, by a spontaneous movement
and without the authority of law or
constitution, got together what it
styles a convention, by which a revised constitution was concoctpd, submitted to the voters in a majority of
the counties, "and in every county not
held by the public enemies of the
country" adopted by a majority of the
votes cast, and proclaimed as the constitution of Tennessee. After citing
the case of Michigan, and referring in
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laudatory terms to the genius of the
Anglo-Saxon race-which, by the way,
has no legally ascertained character,
and is, therefore, dangerous authority
upon which" to rest a grave constitutional question-the opinion concludes
by asking, whether it would "be for a
moment believed, that the people of the
state had not the right to meet in convention and submit propositions to be
voted for by them, which would give
protection to life, liberty, and property?"
The answer must be, certainly not.
The people of Tennesse clearly had
that right; not as a legal one, however, where, as in this case, the convention was assembled without law,
but as a right of force, that is, of
revolution. The court speak of the
right "to make such changes as the
necessities of the times may demand."
This right cannot be denied. It is not
a perfect right, however. It is a right,
when a people are intolerably oppressed, to rise, to better their condition by
the shortest and easiest course, legal
or illegal, but which ripens into a perfect right only when the trial hap been
made and success has been reaped.
If a people can make this trial by cannon, they can undoubtedly make it by
conventions, if that occurs to them as
the readiest mode. But the using, for
revolutionary purposes, of machinery
or devices called by the same names as
others known to the law, by no means
stamps them as legal or constitutional.
A convention assembled in a manner
forbidden by law, or not prescribed by
law, iM not, in a legal sense, a constitutional convention. It is possessed
of no more legal authority to recommend amendments to the constitution
than would be one or a dozen private
individuals, pretending to no official
character. If it is not legal, it is revolutionary-terms which are correlates.
Voa. XIIL-42

Its only validity rests upon the force
which it represents or embodies. This
doctrine is the kernel of the case above
cited, Luther ve. Borden, which in all
aspects covers completely the principal
case.
The facts in that case were briefly
these: A large proportion, claimed to
be a majority, of all the male inhabitants of Rhode Island, above the age
of twenty-one years, had, in primary
meetings, but outside the law, elected
delegates to*a convention, by which a
constitution had bpen framed for the
state. This constitution had been sub:
mitted to a vote of the same class of
persons above described, and received,
as was clear from statistics of population, a large majority of the whole
class, including a majority of the legal
voters of the state under existing laws.
A governor was elected, Thomas W.
Dorr, and an attempt made forcibly to
put the new constitution into operation.
This attempt was resisted, Dorr w"
arrested and tried for treason. A suit
for trespass quare clauaun was brought
by Luther, an adherent of Dorr, against
Borden, an officer under the old government, who under orders had broken
into the house of the plaintiff and arrested him and others harbored there.
The case was tried in the United States
Circuit Court for the District of Rhode
Island, and, to sustain the action, eviaence was offered by the plaintiff, Luther, of all the proceedings resulting,
as it was contended, in the establishment of the Dorr Constitution and the
abrogation of the charter of 1663. The
court held, that those proceedings,
taken and had without the privity and
consent of the existing government, but
in spite of it, were of no force or validity whatever, but revolutionary and
criminal. This decision was afterwards affirmed by the Supreme Court
of the U7nited States, and, it is subT
mitted, stands as the conclusive an-
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thority upon the point, to say nothing
of the common sense of the case: Luthdr vs. Borden, 7 How. 1.
If the Tennessee convention was a
legal assembly, so was that which framed
the Dorr constitution. They wereboth
called by unofficial persons, and not by
established governmental authority.
They both framed constitutions which
were satisfactory probably to the inhabitants of their respective states,
and which were adopted by a majority of those admitted to be voters
under the old laws, who were able to
'vote. What is the difference between
the eases? It is only this. The pro,ceedings in both cases were revoluIutionary. The revolution in Tennessee
-succeeded, got the government hatched
by it recognised; that in Rhode Island
did not.
* It may be said, that it is inconsistent,
of two constitutions, originating in similar irregularities, to require a court to
pronounce one to be at least quasi-legal
and the other to be wholly illegal.
But legality is a question of relations.
A constitution framed under the stringent circumstances detailed in the opinion, may, to those within its circle,
come to possess a real validity, and
yet be founded in an absolute overturning of all law-in a revolution. The
importance of this distinction lies here:
a revolution is not capable of becoming
a precedent, any more than a homicide.
They are, in their essential principle,
similar cases. It is, therefore, to the
last degree important to stamp with
that odious name every political act
which deserves it, because illegal. By
calling it legal, such an act is brought
within the category of precedents, and
will soon come to be cited as legal,
without reference to the circumstances
Which produced it.
It will not be inferred, however, that
when constitutions or the steps leading
to their formation are pronounced revo-

lutionary, the question of their necessity or absolute rightfulness is set at
rest. There are cases in which no
other remedy will suffice but revolution.
A revolution may be peaceful, or it may
be violent and forcible-the essential
quality being, that it is a series of political acts doneagainst law, orwithout law.
The right to resort to it cannot, at this
day, be questioned. Our institutions
were founded in its exercise, and there
have been in our political history, in
what are called peaceable times, numerous acts, more or less justifiable, and
some wholly unjustifiable, which can
be characterized in no other way but
as revolutionary.
The view to take, then, of such cases
is this. The steps by which revolutions
are consummated are, ez Vi termini, illegal. They are steps antagonistic
to an established political order.
They, therefore, cannot be cited, or
considered, *as legal precedents. But
when a revolution has been completed,
has achieved success and recognition,
there arises a new order, which from
that moment is possessed of a legality
of its own. The concrete result-the
new order-is a fact, and there may be
predicated of it the quality of legality,
but a legality which is only relative.
That, however, can never be properly
done of the steps, irregular, violative
of existing laws, from which the new
order sprung. Those steps were revolutionary absolutely. Natural history
furnishes an analogy which perfectly
illustrates the point for which we contend. The polypus is an animal so organized, that it may be violently severed
and the parts still go on in life as distinct animals. As soon as the wound
heals, each part is as independent as
though it had never been united -with
the other; possesses its separate economy and habits,which are relative only
to itself, are its laws. Such a separate
existence may therefore be said to be
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according to the law of nature. Yet it
would be improper to say, that the blow
which severed the original animal, did
not violate its physical constitution;
that it was regular and normal, that is,
according to the law of its organization.
That would be to contend, that the
purpose of its being so organized was,
that it should from time to time be slit
into fragments. The blow, on the contrary, was a shock, a casualty, an act
of violence, a revolution in the animal's
existence, as much so, as though organized in such a manner that death must
have followed.
If, in opposition to this view, we are
referred to the first section of the Tennessee Bill of Rights, above quoted, as
tending to show that the right of a
people to alter or abolish their constitution, at all times, and in such manner
as they may think proper, as therein
declared, is a legal right, and that whatever mode they may adopt, whether by
•fair ballot or by force, is a legal mode,
the reply is, that the true construction
of that section is inconsistent with that
view.
1. The words, "in such manner as
.hey may think proper," found in the
Tennessee and various other constitutions refer not to the amending of constitutions, in peaceable and legal modes,
at all, but to the making of political
changes by force, in cases of overruling
necessity. This is clear from the fact,
that all of our constitutions, which contain this general clause, contain also
another expressly authorizing constitutional amendments to be made in certain prescribed modes,.and that some
of them even forbid the making of
them in the most positive manner
and in negative terms, in any but the
particular modes prescribed. If the
general clause authorizes all modes,
legal as well as forcible or revolutionary, what propriety in inserting the particular clause at all ?

2. The history of the times when our
first constitutions were framed, showa
that our fathers meant by those general
clauses merely to affirm a right of
revolution. They were intended as a
counterblast to the slavish doctrine;
held by tories in England and America,
of non-resistance or passive obedience.
That doctrine, which declared the absolute sinfulness of resistance to kingly
authority in all cases whatsoever, arose
with the house of Stuart in England,
was preached by tories and scouted by
whigs, with alternations of triumph
and overthrow, in the times of Charles
IL., James IL, William IL, Anne, and
so on down to George III. In the time
of William III., and thenceforward
to that of George IIL, the whigs
pretty much succeeded in crushing it.
In the reign of Anne they impeached
Dr. Sacheverell for maintaining it in a
sermon preached before the Commons.'
With George Ill., however, -came a
great tory reaction, and one of the
most pestilent heresies of royalty, with
which our revolutionary fathers had to
contend, was that which maintained the
slavish doctrine in question. It tended
to paralyze the forces of the Revolution
by affecting the con'sciences of the people. It was, therefore, fought inch by
inch, preached.down in the pulpit, argued against on the stump, and nailed
to the wall for public reprobation in
our Bills of Rights.
Such, in brief, is the history of the
origin of this clause in the Tennessee
and other constitutions, so much misapprehended. See Hallam Const. Hist.
England, pp. 174, 602, 603, 604; May's
Const. Hist. England, vol. 2, pp. 20-21,
28-30 ; Bancroft, Hist. U.S., vol. 3, pp.
5-6, vol. 5, pp. 195, 206, 288-9, 324-6.
A curious confirmation of this construction of the clause is found in the Tennessee constitution, from which it is
*here quoted. The section of the Bill
of Rights immediately succeedingthat
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quoted, is as follows: "Government
being instituted for the common benefit,
the doctrine of non-resistance against
arbitrary power and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive to the
good and happiness of mankind :" Art.
1, 2, Const. of 1836. It is almost ludicrous to see men of our own time thus
fighting the old dragon of Passive Obedience, which so terrified our fathers,
years after it had ceased to be anything
but the shadow of a past peril.
The case of Michigan, cited by the
court to establish the legality of the
proceedings in Tennessee, is for that
purpose equally unfortunate. No more
glaring instance of revolutionary action
has occurred in our history. It was so
pronounced at the time even by Mr.
Calhoun. In that case, a territory assumed to determine its own boundaries
and to erect itself into a state, without
the consent of Congress, in whom was
vested, -by the people of the United
States, the real sovereign over the territories, the exercise of all its rights of
sovereignty therein. It is not possible,
in our view, to say a word in favor of
the regularity or legality of the proceedings of that territory. Its convention, that framed its constitution,
in 1835, was wholly illegitimdite, and
so, of course, in its inception, was that
constitution. It is true, Congress saw
fit not to strangle the child, though
illegitimate, but to take it into the
family. But that fact only goes to the
question of legal adoption and succession to the paternal estate, not to that
of lawful generation. Had Congress
refused to ratify the illegal act ef the
territory, its constitution would have
been of no more validity than so much
blank paper. But the General Government was at that time meeker than at
present. It was used to humiliation,
which seemed to be its natural aliment.
Georgia had humiliated it, Missouri
had humiliated it, and South Carolina

had humiliated it. Accordingly, Congress winked at the usurpation and
made a state of the high-flying territory. Then the courts followed, as
they must. The political power had
concluded, notwithstanding the revolutionary proceedings resulting in her
birth, to admit Michigan as a state,
and that foreclosed the judiciary: Scott
vs. Jones's Lessee, 5 How. 343. But
nothing in the action of either Congress
or the courts amounts to an admission,
or tends to prove, that the steps which
resulted in the formation of the first
Michigan constitution, were legal. It
merely pomes to this: having the right
to reject, Congress deemed it expedient
to recognise the territory as a state and
admit it into the Union. This recognition the courts were obliged to follow
and imitate. The illegality had been
condoned, and so cured, but it was
nevertheless an illegality, and, therefore, the case of Michigan is no precedent to bind Congress in the next
case.
Another objection might be taken to
the legality of the proceedings in Tennessee, namely, that, on the loosest
construction of the first section of the
Bill of Rights, it could only be a majority of the people who would have the
right contended for in the opinion,
whereas there is no evidence that a
majority of the people cncurred in
remodelling the constitution of 1835.
A majority voted for the new constitution, says the Chancellor, "in a majority
of the counties, and in every county not
held by the public enemies of the country."
How does it appear from this, that the
majority for the constitution was not
really a minority of all the loyal people
in the state? Such a vote as that described, backed by a sufficient military
force, might pass very well as a step
in the consummation of a revolution,
but considered as a legal poll, it is
J. A. J.
hardly short of a farce.
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Su&reme Court of Pennsylvania.
SPEER et al. VS. THE SCHOOL DIRECTORS AND BURGESS AND
COUNCIL OF BLAIRSVILLE.
The payment of bounties to volunteers, to enable a borough to furnish its military quota under an impending and as yet unexecuted draft, is a payment for a
public or municipal purpose; and a law authorizing a borough or other municipality to raise money for this purpose, by borrowing and taxation, is therefore
constitutional.
Such a law is not within the amendment of 1857 to the Constitution, prohibiting the legislature from authorizing municipalities to 'obtain money for any corporation, association, institution, or party.

IN EQUITY.
diana county.

Appeal-from the Court of Common Pleas of In-

The opinion of the court was delivered by
AGNEW, J.-Perhaps it would be quite as just to say of this
case, as Chief Justice BLACK said of Sharpless vs. The Mayor of
Philadelphia, 9 Harris 158: "This is beyond comparison the
most important cause that has ever been in this court since the
formation of the government."
The millions of money at stake
are greater, and the purpose of their expenditure even more
important. That related 'to subscriptions for mere public convenience-this concerns the lives and welfare of our citizens.
That much of this money has been squandered we must deplore,
and that the laws themselves were loosely penned, denotes a want
of legislative wisdom. They were therefore proper subjects of an
executive message to the legislature. "But," as remarked by
the same judge, "all these considerations are entitled to no
influence here. We are to deal with this strictly as a judicial
question. However clear our convictions may be, that the system
is pernicious and dangerous, we cannot put it down byusurping
authority which does not belong to us. That would be to commit
a greater wrong than any which we could possibly repair by it :"
9 Harris 159.
The presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of
a law; but the request by the concluding counsel, made slightly
imperative by its emphasis, that we should furnish satisfactory
reasons for the constitutionality of the law, seemed to invoke a
contrary presumption. But in Brie & N. B. B. B. Co. vs. Casey,
2 Casey 300, the same learned judge states the rule thus: ",The
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party who wishes us to pronounce a law unconstitutional, takes
upon himself the burthen of proving beyond all doubt that it is
so." We have not only the authority of 0. J. MARSHALL, in
.Fetchervs. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, but that of the distinguished
judge just referred to, for saying: "There is another rule which
must govern us in cases like this, namely, that we can declare
an Act of Assembly void only when it violates the constitution
clearly, palpably, plainly, and in such manner as to leave no
doubt or hesitation in our minds :" 9 Harris 164.
The question before us relates to certain provisions of.the act of
March 25th 1864, for the payment of bounties to volunteers, P. L.
88. It is proper to notice the precise portion to be brought within
the scope of our decision, as no opinion should be ventured beyond it. The plaintiff's bill avers that the defendants are about
to contract for and to borrow five thousand dollars, in the name
and on behalf of the borough of Blairsville, to procure .volunteer
enlistments by paying to each volunteer a bounty of three hundred dollars, to fill the quota assigned to the said borough by the
last requisition of the President, calling for six hundred thousand
men to enter the military service of the United States, and thus
to avoid the draft ordered to take place on the 5th of September
1864, and to make payment therefor by the issue of the bonds
of the said.borough. The plaintiffs suggest their interest as taxpayers, that the debt of the borough will be greatly increased by
the loan, and their taxes largely augmented. The only question
before us is, therefore, upon the power of the legislature to authorize the municipality of Blairsville to borrow money and levy
taxes for its payment, for the purpose of paying bounties to those
who would volunteer to perform the military service due from the
citizens of that municipality, under an impending, but as yet unexecuted draft.
The bill was filed on the 11th of August, and the draft was
not to take effect until the 5th of the following September. The
case, therefore, involves no assumption of past debts, or payments
to persons already in service, but presents the single question of
the power to borrow money and levy taxes to pay volunteers, to
avoid the injury of a public indiscriminate draft.
Beyond all doubt it is competent for the legislature to confer
upon counties, townships, cities, and boroughs, the power to borrow money, issue bonds as the evidence of the debt, and levy
taxes to pay the same. These are ordinary municipal powers in
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daily use, and, when conferred, the only test of their validity is
that the object must be public in its nature. Before the amendment of the constitution in 1857, this poWer was unlimited. Its
limitation I shall notice hereafter. Nor is it doubtful in the least
degree that this limitation is not a general prohibition to borrow
money and levy taxes to pay the same. It would be a startling
fact if the people were now to learn from us that a bridge or poorhouse, or a jail or court-house, cannot be built until the taxes
have been first laid and collected to pay for it.
The power to create a public debt and liquidate it by taxation
is too clear for dispute. The question is tlherefore narrowed to a
single point: is the purpose, in this instance a public one-does
it concern the common welfare and interest of the municipality ?
Let us see. Civil war was raging, and Congress provided, in the
second section of the Act of 24th of February 1864, that the
quota of troops of each ward of a city, town, township, precinct,
&c., should be as nearly as possible in proportion to the number
of men resident therein liable to render military service. Section
8 provided that all volunteers who may enlist after a draft shall
be ordered, shall be deducted from the number ordered to be
drafted in such ward, town, &c. Volunteers are therefore, by
law, to be accepted in relief of the municipality from a compulsory service to be determined by lot or chance. Does this relief
involve the public welfare or interest? The answer rises spontaneously in the breast of every one in a community liable to the
military burden. It is given, not by the voice of him alone who
owes the service, but swells into a chorus from his whole family,,
relatives, and friends. Military service is the highest duty and
burthen the citizen is called to obey or to bear. It involves life,
limb, and health, and is, therefore, a greater " burthen" than the
taxation of property. The loss or the injury is not confined to
the individual himself, but extends to all the relations he sustains.
It embraces those bound to him in the ties of consanguinity,
friendship, and ihterest-to the community which must furnish
support to his family if he cannot; and which loses in him a
member whose labor, industry, and property contribute to its
wealth and its resources; who *assists to bear its burdens, and
whose knowledge, skill, and public spirit contribute to the general
good. Clearly the loss of that part of the population upon whom
the greatest number depend, and who contribute most to the public welfare by their industry, skill, property, and good conduct,
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is a common loss, and therefore a general injury. These are
alike subject to the draft. The blind and relentless lot respects
no age, condition, or rank in life. It is therefore clearly the
interest of the community that those should serve who are willing, whose loss will sever the fewest ties, and produce the least
injury.
The bounty is not a private transaction in which the individual
alone is benefited. It benefits the public by inducing and enabling those to go who feel they can best be spared. It is not
voluntary in those who pay it. The community is subject to the
draft, and it is paid to relieve it from a burthen of war. It is
not a mere gift or reward, but a consideration for service. It is
therefore not a confiscation of one man's property for another's
use, but is a contribution from the public treasury for a general
good. In short, it is simply taxation to relieve the municipality
from the stern demands of war, and avert a public injury, in the
loss of those who contribute most to the public welfare.* This is
the design of the law; and it is no answer to say that bad men
have abused it. The argument which rises, in its conception, no
higher than the relief of the drafted man, and asserts that our
money should not be taken to pay his debt, if not already answered by the magnitude of the public interest involved, has its
reply in the fact that our question presents no such case. In
our case it is yet a matter of public concern, the die has not been
thrown, the draft is yet impending, and no one knows who will
be torn from the community. The case .so stood when this bill
was filed.
It is not the individual payment which tests the public character of the appropriation. Individuals are always the recipients
of public funds. It is paid to salaries, to pensions, to bounties
for the scalps of panthers, wolves, foxes, crows, and blackbirds,
to *the poor, to the education of the young, as rewards for the
apprehension of horse-thieves and felons, to the families of soldiers
in service, to aid hospitals, colleges, agricultural' societies, and to
other useful objects. In all these the recipient is directly benefited, while the public interest in many is not half so imperious
or acute as the relief of a pommunity from an impending draft.
The pursuit of happiness is our acknowledged fundamental
right, and that therefore which makes a whole community unhappy, is certainly a social evil to be avoided if it can be. The
support of the poor affords one among the best illustrations of
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what is a municipal or public appropriation of money. The
pauper is the party directly and solely benefited, while his Pauperism is a public evil, and often is the result of crime. The
pauper has not the merit of the volunteer, while the community
is injured, not benefited, by his support. There is nothing but a
naked public duty performed in his relief. The same may be said
of all expenditures of public money in the punishment of crime.
There is also an illustration to be drawn from those cases (and
they are numerous), sustaining the constitutional authority to
impose unequal burthens, such as the opening, paving, and grad.
ing of streets, the building of sewers, &c.,'where the owners of
adjoining lots are compelled to bear the expense: Mclater8 vs.
Commonwealth, 3 Watts 292; Fenelon's Petition, 7 Barr 175;
Kirby vs. iShaw, 7 Harris 258 ; Schenly vs. City of Allegheny,
1 Casey 128. Kirby vs. Shaw was peculiar, sustaining an Act
imposing a special tax of $500 annually for nine years, upon the
borough of Towanda, for the building of a court-house and jail.
In delivering the opinion, GIBSON, C. J., said: "But it is a postulate of the state constitution, which distinguishes it from the
Federal, that all the power of the people is delegated by it, except such parts of it as are specifically reserved; and the whole
of it is, without exception, vested in the constitutional dispensers
of the public money.
-As regards taxation, there is no limitation of it. Equality
of contribution is not enjoined by the Bill of Rights, and probably
because it was known tp be impracticable."
"If equality were
practicable, in what branch of the government would power to
enforce it reside ? not in the judiciary, unless it were competent
to set aside a law free from collision with the constitution, because
it seemed to be unjust."
In Schenly and Wife vs. The City of Allegheny, the question
arose upon a law to levy a special tax on the owners of lots proportioned to the number of feet fronting on the street, to pay for
grading and paving. The opinion delivered by the present Chief
Justice sustained its constitutionality in forcible terms. After
citing the cases I have referred to, he says: "From the principles
recognised in these cases, it must be apparent that the exercise
of the taxing power by the legislature must become wanton and
unjust-be so grossly perverted as to lose the character of a legislative function, before the judiciary will feel themselves entitled
to interpose on constitutional grounds. To arrest the legislation
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of a free people, especially in reference to burthens self-imposed
for the common good, is to restrain the popular sovereignty, and
should have clear warrant in the letter of the fundamental law."
The extent of the taxing power entered largely into the dis.
cussions in Sharpless vs. Mayor of Philadelphia. BLACK, C. J.,
said: c I use the language of C. J. MARSHALL (4 Wheaton 316),
when I say, that it may be exercised to any extent to which the
government may choose to carry it, and that no limit has been
assigned to it because the exigency of the government cannot be
limited." And again-" I am of opinion that a tax-law must be
considered valid unless it be for a purpose in which the community
taxed has palpably no interest; when it is apparent that the burden is imposed for the benefit of others, and where it would be
pronounced so at thefirst blush." In the same case, after stating
the high grounds required to justify the judiciary in declaring law
unconstitutional, the present Chief Justice said, with his usual
emphasis, ,But on lower ground than this, and especially on
ground.so low as the equivocal and undefinedpurposes of municipal
-orporations,Acts of Assembly have never been declared unconstitutional."
These strictly legal views have even been embodied into a sentiment by the late Chief Justice LOWBIE, in a case of municipal
subscriptions. His language deserves translation into this case.
"When people," says he, , shall have discovered the exact boundary between engagements that are peculiarly social, and those
which are peculiarly individual, then possibly they may be morally
entitled to declare, that they and their governor and legislature
and judiciary have violated their constitution in making such
contracts. But even then they cannot honestly retrace their
steps without making restitution to those whom they have misled :"
Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas vs. Oommissioners of Allegheny, 8
Casey 238:
Municipal subscriptions to corporation stocks are no longer
authorized; but Sharpless vs. The Mayor of Philadelphia,and
cases following in its wake, continue to be authoritative expositions of the nature and extent of the taxing power, and the scepe
of its purposes. It was there held that taxation is not an infringement of the rights of property, is not a taking within the constitutional prohibition, nor such an injury as can invoke the constitutional right to judicial remedy.
If then it be within the scope of a municipal purpose to grant
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pensions, pay bounties, give rewards for the destruction of noxious
animals, and the arrest of felons, employ watchmen, support
paupers, build almshouses, bridges, and markets, aid charitable
institutions, make roads, and grade and pave streets, at private
expense, how much more is that a public affair, which has for its
object to prevent the forcible and blind extradition of a valuable
part of the population into a service dangerous to the lives and
limbs of those who go, and destructive of the welfare and happiness of those who remain! Nor can the dilemma be avoided. It
is imposed by the exigency bf war and the duty of public defence.
The purpose being clearly municipal, because of its public
nature, and therefore within the authority to tax, the power to
borrow money in anticipation of the levy is ancillary, following as
of course, unless within the amendment of 1857 to the constitution. This then is the next question. The amendment provides
that: "cThe legislature shall not authorize any county, city,
borough, township, or incorporated district, by virtue of a vote
of its citizens, or otherwise, to become a stockholder in any company, association, or corporation, or to obtain money for, or to
loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institution, or
party." Granting for the purpose of the argument that party
here means person or individual, the only part of the amendment
to be considered is the clause, ,"or to obtain money/for any party."
We have before us no subscription to stock or mere loan of credit.
The prohibition of the clause is clearly not against obtaining
money for individuals, in the sense of those appropriations which
involve the public interest; otherwise this would overthrow the
whole power to borrow money to perform ordinary municipal
functions. It certainly does not prohibit the obtaining of money
to pay contractors for.bridges, paving, market-houses, &c., or to
pay laborers, artisans, or material-men engaged upon a public
work. In every such case when money is borrowed to pay individuals, it is in a broad sense obtaining money for a party. But
the sense of the amendment is evidently a restricted one. Its
leading thought is the loan of the public money or credit to private parties corporated or unincorporated. It is not payment in its
proper sense which is prohibited, but the private use or control
of the public funds. Payment implies a previous debt or consideration, but here advances or loans, which import no obligation
or consideration, are the objects of prohibition. There is not a
word in the amendment which interdicts the borrowing of money

668

SPEER ET AL. vs. SCHOOL DIRECTORS O

BLAIRSVILLE.

merely, or the pledging of the public credit for a municipal purpose, to be laid out by authorized public officers or agents. The
purpose was to prevent the money of the people from passing into
the control of private irresponsible associations or parties, and
from being squandered in undertakings of doubtful propriety, or
being liable to be lost through the want of integrity of those
engaged in its disbursement. It intended to confine the municipal expenditures not only to public objects, but to public officers
or agents under their direct responsibility to the municipality.
This is seen in the whole section. Therefore, the municipality
shall not become a stockholder in a corporation or association, for
this would be to make it a corporator or partner in the company,
and place its funds under the control of its associates. Nor shall
it obtain money for these private parties. If I obtain money for
another, I do not mean that I am paying him my own debt.
Then I should obtain the money for myself not for him. If I borrow to pay what I am bound to pay, I borrow for inygelf. But
the expression " obtain money for," is immediately followed and
explained by its adjunct, cor to loan its credit to," both being
linked together in the same sentence before the object or party,
common to both expressions, is reached. The history of the
amendment also informs us that subscriptions to stock and lending the credit of the municipalities to private corporations and
associations were the evils to be remedied. But individuals are
always in some capacity the recipients of the public money. It
makes no difference, therefore, whether a party paid is a volunteer, or a witness, viewer, juror, laborer, pauper, or pensioner.
The true question is, whether the money is borrowed for a public purpose and paid bond fide to a proper person for this purpose,
or whether it is money obtained as a loan or advance to the use
of private parties.
In the case before us the object is not to obtain money for the
volunteer, but for the community, which is to be relieved by the
In proper contemplation, the obtaining of the
volunteer.
money precedes any knowledge of the volunteer, who only becomes known as he steps forward to close with the public offer,
and accept the proffered bounty as the consideration of his service. The consideration given on his side is most valuable-be
enlists into a dangerous service, running the risk of life and limb ;
and takes upon himself the burthen resting upon the whole community subject to the lot. The public welfare, as I have already
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shown, is most intimately involved in the draft, which enters
directly within the field of municipal affairs. The die is not cast,
and the lot is yet uncertain. All are liable within the ages of
the greatest capability for usefulness. The chosen may be the
most valuable, useful, and needed members of society, whose
extradition may produce the greatest injury and the most distress.
The public interest is more involved in the ills of a draft, than in
many evils, recognised as public in their nature. An obstruction
to a highway and a disorderly house, perhaps hurtful to but few,
are punished as public nuisances. Even sounds and smells .claim
public attention. An impending draft is an evil certainly more
to be dreaded than the odor of a pig-stye, or the.clatter of horns.
Can it be that citizens may be torn from the community and
social ties ruptured, to drag them.into a dangerous public service,
and yet, community cannot interfere to save them on the ground
that it is only a private affair. Their property may be protected
from the storage of powder, by municipal regulations, but their
bodies cannot be saved from being made food for powder in the
public defence. It is possible to hold the disc of the dollar so
closely to our eyes, that it excludes from sight every object of
public interest and blinds us to every sentiment of humanity. I
hold, therefore, that money paid to save a community from a
draft, is not obtained for any party or individual, bht is a direct
appropriation to a public purpose, and that raising money by the
ordinary powers of borrowing and taxation for a common purpose,
affecting the interests, happiness, and welfare of a community, is
not obtaining money or loaning credit to any party within the
terms of the amendment.
But if this case fall within the letter of the clause, it is .within
the spirit and demands of all the exceptions, in the amendments
of 1857, when taken together as a whole. The first section limits
the state debt to seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars; yet
the second gives unlimited power to contract debts, to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, and defend the state in war. Two
invasions of our state, and the character of the war, attest the
necessity of this provision, But it is said that protection against
invasion and insurrection is a federal duty. True, it is so by an
express grant of power. But, by the same constitution, every
right not delegated is reserved to the-states or people, and I finl
no clause in the constitution by which the right of self-protection
is taken away from the states in all respects. On the contrary,
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I find that, in time of war, or when actually invaded, or in imminent danger, not admitting of delay, the right of the state to
keep. troops or ships of war is reserved by expres s exception.
The kind of war is not defined, foreign or civil; nor is the duty
or mode of self-protection prescribed or limited. To say, therefore, in the face of a civil war raging from Pennsylvania to the
Gulf, and of invasions far within her borders, bringing ruin on
thousands of her citizens, who are now knocking at the doors of
the legislature for public compensation, that there is no power in
the state to preserve her territory from irruption, and the lives
and property of her people, is to outrage the first law of nature
and of government, and to bring unmerited reproach upon the
wisdom of the founders of our institutions. Why shall not the
state offer inducements to her citizens to go into the federal
service to assist in preserving us from the ravages of war ?
What clause of federal or state constitution forbids it ?
By the sixth section of the amendments, the commonwealth is
forbidden to assume the debt or any part of it of any county, city,
borough, or township; but the exception immediately follows;
unless such debt shall have been contracted to enable the state to
repel invasion, suppress domestic insurrection, or defend itself in
time of war. Now, the exception here implies two things: first,
that a municipality may be authorized to contract a debt for defence in time of war or of invasion; and next, that such a debt
may be assumed by the state. If we suppose a literal difference
in the fact that the volunteer goes directly into the service of the
United States, yet the motive is state defence, and the means thus
employed not only actually contribute to this purpose, but experience has shown to be most effective to the desired end. In such
a war as this has' been, wherein is the difference between the
.strong federal arm outstretched for our protection under the
injunction of the Federal Constitution, and the feebler hands of
the state militia, that we should declare authoritatively that the
former cannot be aided by the state while the latter only can be
used? Who has forgotten the mighty shock of arms at Gettysburg, when the whole power of the nation was held in doubtful
conflict by a giant and determined foe, and when for three anxious days prayers ascended to the God of battles and loyal men
held their breaths uncertain upon which side the victory had settled ? It therefore becomes us well to pause, before we stand on
such narrow ground. Rather should we become humble pupils
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in that great school of experience which has taught us how near
we were to total defeat. In view of these grave realities of war,
and of the necessities of defence, how can it be supposed that a
free and intelligent people, in avoiding the evils of municipal
subscriptions, run so far into-the opposite extreme, that they have
stripped themselves of the power of incurring a debt in defence
of their lives and property at a time of ,great public exigency ?
On the contrary, every line and clause of the exceptions bristle,
as it were, with steel, against this artificial, feeble, and unfriendly
interpretation.
If we refer to the Federal Constitution, we find the war powers
wholly conferred upon the Federal Government, including the duty
of protection to the states ; while the states are prohibited from
" engaging in war unless when actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." In returning to the
state constitution, we discover that the exception in the sixth
section of the amendments does not stop with a draft contracted
to enable the state to repel invasion and suppress domestic insurrection, but includes also debts contracted to enable the state to
defend itself in time of tvar. Clearly, this is not mere tautology,
and something was meant by defence in time of war beyond inva'"
sion or imminent danger of it. Then how defend itself? what
provision in the constitution confines state defence to calling out
the militia merely? what is ihere to forbid the encouragement of,
or procuring of volunteers to enter into the federal service when
it is manifest it directly promotes the defence of the state ? In
spirit, phrpose, and language, therefore, such a debt is clearly
within the exception to the amendment.
There is nothing, in my judgment, in the argument founded
upon the alleged repugnance of the law to the federal power to
raise and support armies. There isno conflict of jurisdiction Qr
of power. Admitting to the fullest extent the incompatibility of
any state law assuming to regulate or to interfere with the raising
and supporting of a federal army, there is here no interference,
no regulation, and no repugnance. Congress purposely refrained
from occupying the whole field of power, and expressly provided
for the acceptance of volunteers in discharge of the draft. The
Act of February 24th 1864, after providing for the distribution
of military service by quotas among the municipalities of each
state, declared that -ill volunteers who .may enlist after the draft
shall be ordered, and before it shall actually be xmade, .shall be
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deducted from the number ordered to be drafted in such ward,
town or township, precinct, election district, or county." This
portion of the field as to procuring volunteers, was therefore left
open to the exercise of any means to induce persons to enlist in
relief of the municipality from the pending, but as yet unexecuted
draft. That this was intentional is recognised bl the terms of the
law. The third proviso of the seventh section, which provides
for transfers into the naval service, declares that the bounty money
received from the state, by any mariner or seamdn enlisting from
that state, shall be deducted from his prize-money. The proviso
in the twentieth section, authorizing the discharge of minors entering the service without consent of their parents or guardians,
expressly requires such persons, their parents or guardians, first
to repay to the government and to the state and local authorities,
all bounties and advance pay which may have been paid to them.
The federal law therefore does not assume to control or direct
the procuring of volunteers. It simply suffers or permits the
citizens to come forward voluntarily, and accept the service of the
men to be drafted, and contemplates that inducements in the shape
of bounties will be held out to volunteers by the states and municipalities from which they come.
The argument, therefore, that the act of the legislature providing for the payment of bounties to volunteers comes into conflict with the federal law for drafting men into the service, has
not a single foot to stand upon. There is not a single point of
conflict. The state bounty operates only upon the will of the
citizen to induce him to volunteer, and ends with his acceptance
into service. It does not even undertake to determine his fitness
to serve, but leaves this to the operation of the federal law. And
this is a decisive answer to the argumeiit that the state bounty
throws upon the service unfit persons, while it saves the young
and vigorous. If the fact be so, it is an argument to be addressed
to Congress to amend its law, or punish the federal agents. It
is a most singular conception that the malpractice of the federal
officials in this respect proves the unconstitutionality of the state
law; and if it were not uttered with great gravity by counsel of
commanding position, I should suspect it of irony.
In view of the perfect line of demarcation which separates the
state and federal laws in this instance, it is unnecessary to treat
the case upon authority. But I may refer to the single case of
Weaver vs. Fegely et al., 5 Casey 27, where the rules governing
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questions of conflict between federal and state legislation are
stated and the authorities collected. The rule applied to such a
case as this is, that the implication against the power of the state
can only arise where the state authority is absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant.
The decree of the Court of Common Pleas is therefore affirmed.
THOmPSON, J., filed a dissenting -opinion, in which WOODWARD,
C. J., concurred.
The chief, if not the only, object of written constitutions, is
the limitation of the powers of government, whether they are to
be exercised by the few or the many, and it is only by such
means that the people can be assured against the encroachments
of power. - Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty," in any
form of government, so prone is power to advance beyond, rather
than to recede, within its just limits. Resistance and bloodshed
designed to rebuke and restrain it, have crimsoned the pages of
history for ages; but it is to modern civilization the boast belongs
of a remedy in the limitations of constitutions and charters. But
these, to be effectual, must be enforced. Neither times nor circumstances should claim exemption from these limitations. The
more turbulent the one, or pressing the other, the more need
there is of adhering to them. When peace reigns, an enlightened
people need to realize but little the fact of government. The
times when it is the most to be valued and venerated, is, when
commotion, excitement, peril, and war exist. Then all need its
protection, and none are safe unless its orders are observed.
We have, I am happy to say, just emerged from such a condition, and if we have passed through the ordeal, with even but littie to condemn as infractions of the constitutions of our country,
we may rejoice. If, on the contrary, their safeguards have been
weakened or' overthrown, it should be known, and the injury
repaired as speedily as possible.
The political division of the sovereign power of the Commonwealth, into. the legislative, executive, and judicial, had for its
object the same end which the constitution itself had, namely, the
limitation of power; and it was supposed to be of value to the
security of the principles of the constitution itself, and no doubt
it is ; but, notwithstanding the legislative power is conferred on
a Senate and House of Representatives, with a limited control on
part of the exedutive, it often happens that all these are mistaken
VOL. XIII.-43
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in the fact of the constitutionality of enactmehts ; so indeed may
the judiciary be, but beyond their action there is no legal appeal;
it is necessarily final.
Whether an act be constitutional or not is a judicial fact, to be
determined by the application of principles and rules like any
other fact, and if by the application of such rules and principles
it is found to be violative of the constitution, it has no effect, because it is IOT A LAW. It is-paradoxical to say a law is unconstitutional. To arrive at a conclusion that an act is not constitutional, is to announce that there is no law on the subject. It is
true the current terms descriptive of such a result are, that the
law is unconstitutional and void. The people should know that a
court neither wills a law to be unconstitutional, nor are they in
the least degree to be thought antagonistic to those who pass it,
when they pronounce it so. We look at it as we do at the deed
by which a man claims an estate, which if invalid we so declare
without willing it to be so, or in any spirit of hostility to him for
having claimed under it; he may have done so in entire honesty,
but that alone will not make his title good, if for good reasons it
is bad. Nor will the best and most patriotic intentions make
that a law which contradicts the principles of the constitution or
contravenes its prohibitions.
The elementary principles that govern in judging the constitutionality of an act of the legislature are, that until the contrary appear, it is to be presumed constitutional. This is due to
the high official character of the bodies which have sanctioned it.
He, therefore, who alleges the invalidity of an act, must establish that fact. In doing this, as it is in denial of the right to
legislate in the particular instance, and as in the state constitution, whatever of legislative power is not withheld may be exercised, he must establish his position clearly and conclusively.
For a doubt about the power of legislation, in any given instance,
is not equivalent to a denial of it. If, therefore, the clear principles of government, as disclosed by the constitution, either
expressly or by necessary result, condemn the act now under consideration, and others of like kind; we cannot, if we would,
avoid saying so. Let us therefore proceed, with the utmost care,
to see how this is, for it may not be disguised that the question
in its consequences is of vast importance to the people of this
Commonwealth.
On the 25th of March 1864, when the act referred to in the
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complainant's bill was passed, there had existed a state of war,
between the United States and the so-called government of the
" Confederate States of America," for nearly three years. It was
war; so treated by all the branches of the government of the
United States, in fact, by all foreign powers. In consequence
thereof, on the 3d of March 1863, an act was passed by Congress, known as the ,,Conscription Law," by which all able-bodied
male citizens of the United States, and foreigners, who bad
declared their intentions to become citizens, between the ages of
twenty and forty-five years, were declared to constitute the
"national forces" of the country, and made liable to perform
military duty as soldiers, when called out by the President for
that purpose. The law applied to and operated on every individual of the class, as was held by the majority of this court in
the Conscription Cases, 9 Wright 238, and therefore each man
was obliged under the penalties due to desertion in times of war,
to respond for himself, either by becoming a soldier, furnishing a
substitute, or paying $300 commutation. It is an undoubted
duty of'all to sustain the state against its enemies, those who are
able as soldiers in the field, and all others in some systematic forni
of contribution in money; always in constitutional governments
levied by taxation.
Seryice in the field, at the call of the superior lord, was incident to the feudal tenures; and the same was due from the lords
and their feudatories to the king. So, the principle, not exactly
as incident of tenure, has come to us, and must as a necessity
exist in every government.
The aggregate of individuals in a state compose its forces, and
it is only by this aggregation of services due by each man capable
of bearing arms that an army can be raised. The service is personal, however called.for, either by the state or general government, and of course whatever might be rendered as an equivalent
for that service by the individual owing it, must also be personal
and individual. However much any community may be interested
in the creation of an army, it is not a matter of public concern
that this or that man is liable to be called on to enter it. The
state is bound to sustain him with the means of living while in it,
and the modern rule is to compensate him also for his services.
This, however, is of grace on part of the state; yet undoubtedly
it is his duty to defend it if required, pay or no pay. But it
would be a startling assumption to claim that the community, or
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any'portion of it, are bound to contribute money to provide a
substitute, to enable him to escape the service altogether! To
maintain this would be at once a denial of the obligation, that
each individual is, in his own person, bound to defend or aid in
defence of the state in some of the modes which the state may
prescribe. It is not easy to elucidate or prove the existence of
what is self-evident, and that is the difficulty in the way in demonstrating that the service of an enrolled citizen, if drawn, is personal, or, if only liable to be drawn, the same. That it is individual and personal, I think, none can doubt.
It seems to me, if this be so, the authority conferred by Act
of the 25th of March 1864, if it be of authority at all, and the
validity of which we are now to determine, is plainly an Act to
authorize a tax for private and individual purposes, and not for a
public or general purpose. Let us briefly analyze a portion of it.
The sixth section provides that the commissioners of tie several
counties be authorized to borrow such amounts of money, as may
be sufficient to pay to each non-commissioned officer and soldier,
who may thereafter volunteer in the service of the United States
from such county, and be credited to the quota thereof, in pursuance of a requisition of the President, a bounty of $300 each;
and in case the county commissioners shall fail or neglect to do
so, then the minor divisions, such as townships, boroughs, wards,
and school districts are authorized to exercise the power for themselves. Then, by the seventh section, "the county commissioners,
or school directors, road commissioners, or supervisors of any
township; or the corporate authorities of any city, ward, or
borough," are authorized to issue bonds or certificates of indebtedness in the name of such county, township, borough, &c., with or
without interest, and payable at such times as the authorities and
party lending may agree upon; and to lay and assess a tax or
taxes on all property taxable for state and county purposes to
pay the same when due.
These provisions apply to the procurement of volunteers, but
other provisions in the act go a great way beyond this, and require these county and subordinate authorities to borrow money
and impose taxes, to comply with all agreements previously made
by them without authority; and "to refund advancements made
to procure volunteers by any committee, special commissioners,
individual, or individuals."
Let it be noticed that not only soldiers to take the place of
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those that the Act of Congress designated, but that the selfcreated creditors of the district, become so in order to save themselves from services, are required to be paid their outlays. I do
not think it necessary to give a synopsis of all the provisions of the
act, and I forbear the attempt, with the expression of'my conscientious belief, that from the foundation of the colony of Pennsylvaniia,
or any other state, to the day of the passage of this act, no parallel
to it can be f6und in the recklessness of power, conferred to create
debts without limit or stint, and to authorize the assessment of
taxes to any, even to 100 per cent. of the assessed value of the
real and personal property of the people, if so much be required
to pay the indebtedness authorized at the time or times agreed
upon. Call it by what name we may, its operation is a surrender
of the property of the people to the keeping of the local authorities, elected in view, in most instances, of ordinary local duties,
and generally with no reference to qualifications fqr the exercise
of such unlimited powers. In portions of the state it is a matter
of public notoriety that ten, fifteen, twenty-two, and even thirtysix per cent. on the assessed value of real estate, has, for this
year, been levied under this authority, and that of special acts.
I submissively ask, if this may be done under our constitutional
government, is it any better than a despotism, especially in view
of the fact that every particle of the service sought would have
been secured without such a resort?
I have endeavored to show, and I think have succeeded in
showing, that any man fit for military duty, enrolled under the
Acts of Congress, owes a veraonal duty to the country to the
extent which that law requires (it being declared constitutional in
the decisions referred to), and that there is no real hardship in
requiring him to perform it, because a condition of his membership of society, and reciprocal for a duty on part of government
to protect him. This being so, the act in question is not that
defenders of the country may be raised up by the fruits of taxation by local authority, but that those enrolled may not be called
to fill the local quota, and that others may, by means of money
raised from the people, be induced to take their places. What is
this but taxation for the benefit of those designated to fill the
quota in any district, be the number one, two, or one hundred ?
Each one of the number relieved is released from a debt he owes
the country, and the community pays for it. Is not money raised
for this purpose a private purpose ? The enrolled man must go
if the wheel of the provost-marshal says so, or find a substitute,
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or pay a 9ertain sum of money. These alternatives are his, and
the public have nothing to do with them. It has no interest in
the question of his compensation; the government calling him
provides that. If the public can be assessed to raise the means
to relieve him from going to the field, or providing a substitute,
is this not solely his advantage, and not a benefit, in any sense, to
the public ? The inquiry to be answered in this case is simply and
singly this, Is it within any grant of legislative power, that the
legislature may authorize taxation of the people to pay the debt,
or discharge the private obligation of any individual in the community? I need not argue as to the power of the state over
money in its treasury ; but can it delegate its power of taxation
to a county or township to raise money for a mere private purpose ; for one citizen, or a dozen? The service of the soldier, it
is true, may secure a great public end, but his service is rendered,
when required by the government, as a service owing in his own
right, and under an obligation resting on him as a man and a citizen,
and not on community. The purpose would be no less a private
purpose than would an authority to tax the people to pay militia
fines, or fines for non-attendance of jurors, or penalties enforced
for the non-performance or violations of any statute law. The
duty to perform the service or pay the penalty belongs to the
individual and not to the public, although the public alone may
be benefited by the service. Bounties and gratuities to soldiers
are patriotic and commendable undoubtedly, but it is the duty of
the government to pay them, if they be deemed necessary; or
private liberality should provide them, but it is not a legitimate
purpose of a township, ward, or borough to create debts for any
such object. While there may be. an implied duty to contribute
by taxes to local public purposes, and the right to exercise legislative power may possibly be conferred to enable this to be done
in some possible cases, yet for private purposes no law can compel this, and the authority of this court clearly stands for this.
In Sharpless vs. The City of Philadelphia,9 Harris 147, this
was not only over and over again said, but it was only by escaping from the conclusion, that the purpose of county subscriptions
to railroad corporations was not a private purpose and object,
that it was arrived at at all. This was the strain of the case.
Nothing that Chief Justice BLACK uttered on that point was in
any way dissented from by those who concurred with him in the
judgment; in fact it was the postulate of all their opinions.
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He said: c Taxation is a mode of raising money for public
purposes; when it is prostituted to objects in no way connected
with the public interest or welfare, it ceases to be taxation and
becomes plunder. Transferring money, fron the owners ef it,
into the possession of those who have no title to it, though it be
done under the name and form of a tax, is unconstitutional for all
the reasons which forbid the legislature to usurp, any othei power
not granted to them." Again, "neither has the legislature 'any
constitutional right to create a public debt, or lay a tax, or authorize any municipal corporation to do it for a mere private
purpose." * * * "The right to tax depends on the ultimate
use, purpose, and object for which the fund is raised, and not on
the nature or character of the person or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it. A tax for a private
purpose is unconstitutional, although it passes through the hands
of public officers,"
These were weighty and well-considered words, and marked a
distinction which, had it been regarded, even if there had been
no other protection against the legislation contained in the Act
of 25th March 1865, would have saved the people of the state
not less than forty millions of dollars, in addition to the legitimate
expenses of the war which they ought cheerfully to pay. Corruption and bounty brokerage would have fared less sumptuously
it is true, but the military service of the country would have been
benefited by all the difference between hirelings gathered up, as
was generally the case, to fill quotas, without regard to capacity,
patriotism, 'or country, and good sound citizens. I grant -that
good men often availed themselves of these bounties, but they
would have responded to the call of their country without .them.
The adventurer, bounty-jumper, and broker, fattened on the
fruits of this grievous mislegislation. The service was positively
injured by it.
It is history now, that the evils resulting from conferring on
municipal corporations the power to tax themselves even for
public purposes eventuated so oppressively as to move the people, almost with one accord, to amend the constitution, that such
a thing might not occur again. Many counties, even to this day,
groan beneath the weight of the burthen recklessly imposed by
the exercise of these local legislators, empowered to bind them.
What must the state of feeling in those regions be when "swarms
of officeholders" created by this, and laws of the kind, call for
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the substance of the people, to pay what has been squandered on
persons, and for objects, that neither they nor their posterity may
ever discover the benefit of, or authority for ? It was a sad expedient, this authority to municipal boards, even if legal. We had
federal authority clothed with ample power to raise the necessary taxes for the war, and to appropriate it to purposes the most
beneficial to the cause of all. This was a clear constitutional
right, guarded not only by every legal protection, but to be administered, in the face of the nation, and subject to receive either
its approval or condemnation. It seems to me that even the
warmest advocate of township, ward, or school district legislation,
will hardly claim for them a much superior opportunity of judging accurately, as to what was best to be done for the , common
defence and general welfare," than Congress; and yet nothing
but a thorough conviction of this ought to have justified the
transfer of such legislation or power to such bodies. I admit
that this court has no power to correct unwise legislation; bad it
may be, but if only so, we cannot interfere; it is not our business
to rebuke it, but it is a significant symptom that it is unauthorized
if so oppressive to the people as this legislation must prove. The
constitution is the only safeguard in times of danger-to abandon
the safeguard is equalled only by the wisdom that would abandon
a secure anchorage in a storm, to run the chances of being
stranded on a lee-shore.
In Phila. Asso. for the Relief of DisabledFiremen vs. Wood, 8
Wright 72, this court refused to aid the recovery of money secured by bond to be paid to the association, as a duty or impost
authorized by the legislature, in consideration of a license as a
foreign insurance agent. It was thought to be repugnant to
rightful legislation, to grant a privilege to a company on terms of
its -paying a duty or impost to a private association of individuals.
LOWRIE, C. J., said, in delivering the opinion, " a tax is an imposition for the supply of the public treasury, and not for the supply of individuals or private corporations, however benevolent
they may be." And I will add, or patriotic, unless it -be a puiblic duty. I hold, therefore, without hesitancy, that the act in
question which proposers to authorize the corporations named to
create debts and assess taxes to pay bounties is void; because the
purpose is private and not within any grant of power to the
General Assembly, and being so is unconstitutional and not a law.
This view is not all. It only regards the misconstruction of the
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powers conferred by the constitution, but it touches not those
denied or prohibited. There is no essential difference, however,
in the effect of an adverse conclusion, on either principle. For
there is just as little right to exercise powers not granted, as those
prohibited. The same word might not characterize both, and
that is the only difference.
In 1857 the people of the Commonwealth thought it necessary
to establish limitations on the subject of state and local indebtedness,'and they very clearly defined those .they desired in Art. IL
A certain amount of indebtedness was fixed as the limit beyond
which the State could not go, excepting to'suppress insurrection
defend the state in time of war, or redeem the present indebtedness of the state. And she was forbidden in any manner to
pledge or loan her credit to "any individual, company, corporation, or association, or to become a joint owner or stockholder in
any company, corporation, or association ;" or assume the debt
or any part thereof, of any county, city, borough or township, or
corporation, unless such debt shall have been contracted to enable
the state to repel invasion, suppress domestic insurrection, defend
itself in times of war, or to assist the state in the discharge of any
portion of its indebtedness. So much for the limitations on the
legislature in regard to the state. They are clear and plain, and
the objects, the security of the people from the dangers of inordinate burthens and taxation, to pay debts contracted under
excitement or otherwise, is palpable in every word. The next
clause limits the authority of the legislature equally explicitly in
regard to the municipal divisions of the state. It is as follows :
"The legislature shall not authorize any county, city, borough
or township, or unincorporated district, by virtue of a vote of its
citizens, or otherwise, to become a stockholder in any company,
association, or corporation, or to obtain money for, or loan its
credit to, any corporation, association, institution, or party."
The inquiry by one of the counsel for complainant, " can there
be a doubt that the amendment was intended to cover everything
outside of the legal and legitimate current expenses for the law,
ful administration of the government of the county, borough, or
township," has not been, and cannot be, satisfactorily answered
negatively. State, county, borough, city,, and township had
grievously sinned in the creation of- debts under the constitution.
To restrain this position, in all time to come, was the object of
the people in this legislation. This is the plain obvious meaning
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of these provisiouxs, and this is just the rule by which constitutional provisions are to be interpreted: 9 W. & S. 127, 5 Wright
454. The enumerated classes to which the prohibition extends,
cover by all fair interpretation every artificial or natural person
or thing that can use money. Government, church, state, society,
corporation, association, institution, person or persons, are all
included in the terms used. If technicality may find any way of
escape from the generality of the prohibition, I am not ingenious
enough to discover how. But we are not allowed the use of such
a process to sap and mine the buttresses of the constitution. It is
the legislation of the people we are to deal with, and it is to be
read and obeyed in the plain meaning of the words they have
chosen to use. This is the judicial rule also, and must be obeyed.
Now, it matters not, in this view of the subject, whether the
bounties to be paid by money to be borrowed, by counties, townships, &c., are in aid of the United States, the state, individuals
liable to be drafted, or those who have advanced money to encourage volunteering, or to comply with contracts made with volunteers. All these are either corporations, associations, or parties. A government is a corporation aggregate. It never dies,
and it is this that gives it immortality. All its people die in succession, but still it lives; the King is a corporation sole: 1 Black.
Com. 458-9; and so is a Bishop. Government is also an institution; and if it should ever enter the brain of any school district
authority, or supervisor of a township, to lend the credit of his
department to the United States, here is, fortunately, authority
to prevent it. It would be, however, to impute an extreme of
folly and absurdity to the legislature, far beyond that which
might lead to constitutional mistakes, to suppose that the authority to raise bounties was given to aid the government of the
United States, already armed with the amplest power, as was said
by a majority of this court in the Conscription Cases, 9 Wright,
to compel each individual man to enter the military service on its
own terms. But even if the folly could be imputed,'which decency forbids, the legislature never had the right to grant the
power for any such purpose. It was not granted to them to
authorize such cc entangling alliances."
The authority given to these corporations is to borrow money,
to repay advancements by individuals and committees, and to
relieve enrolled citizens from the draft. These purposes may
not be included in the prohibition to borrow money for any cor-
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poration, association, or institution. This is admitted; but it is
demonstrably clear ",that any party," the aid of which is also
prohibited, does include all these. Whom do these words describe, if not persons not embraced in the terms ",corporations,"
"cassociations," or "cinstitutions" ? We have seen that these last
are large terms, and they embrace every person except private
individuals. As the expression ,party" was not used to describe
those embraced by the preceding terms, it must have some application, gnd to what can it have application excepting to the class
not embraced by them, which must be unassociated individuals?
The other classes being embraced by th6 preceding terms, we
must give effect to this expression. Nobody ever heard of a
constitutional provision being discarded as meaning nothing.
This, however, must come to pass before we can find constitutional
authority for the borrowing and consequent taxation authorized
by these bounty laws. The words used mean unassociated or
private individuals, or they mean nothing. Such purpose is
prohibited.
The third definition of the word "party" by Webster is "one
concerned or interested in an affair" (e. g.) ",he was not a party
to the trespass or affray ;" " he is not a party to the contract or
agreement." We know its ordinary sense is even more extensive
in its applicition to individuals than this. We say of one, he is
a party to be trusted;benefited, or a party proper to be employed,
or a party to be avoided, and the like. All these expressions
apply as well to individuals as to associations, contractors, or litigants. There is ne sense, however, in which it can be used in
this amendment, but to individuals. But even if there be, the
prohibition is no less positive. The power given by the act was
to encourage volunteering, no matter whether it be a pecuniary
benefit to the party volunteering or to the party who escaped the
draft. It was authority to pledge the credit of the municipality
to borrow money to be redeemed by taxation, for a ,party," and
this the people have said, with what effect this decision will show,
should not be done.
Of a constitution, MARSHALL, 0. J., in -JcCulloughvs. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 897, said, -Its nature, therefore, requires only
that its great outlines should be marked, its important objects
designated, and the main ingredients which compose those objects
must be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves." The
words in this amendment mark distinctly enough the outline and
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object to be attained, and we must absolutely close our eyes to
avoid seeing that corporate indebtedness beyond the purposes
expressly allowable, created by irresponsible and unfit agents or
any agents, and to be followed by onerous taxes, was the thing
intended to be guarded against. And it is just in times of public
excitement and alarm that such a provision is a protection.
There may be people constituted to believe that the only object
of the constitutional amendment was to prevent a recurrence to
municipal subscriptions to railroads or other corporations, and
that everything outside of that and within the -omnipotence of
parliament" remained as it was. I cannot believe that thus
thought the people. It is evident that everything not legitimate
to corporate purposes was intended to be forbidden. The words
used are broad enough for this. Shall we dwarf their significance to suit the tide of the times? We ought to have no choice
but to give them the construction they ordinarily bear and the
effect intended; this would effectually prevent corporate indebtedness to aid even the Union in carrying on a war, or any other
party, outside of the sphere of legitimate municipal operations.
It would inevitably condemn such authority as is given by this
act and all other~ke acts.
There is still another objection to this act, and to which much
force in argument was directed at both hearings of this case. In
one sense, it arises out of a conflict of authority between national
and state legislation; or rather it involves the rights and privileges of the citizens of a state, secured by the constitution of the
United States, the benefit of which they may lawfully claim.
More distinctly, it is this: Congress has, by express grant, power
to declare war, raise and support armies, and maintain a navy.
It is invested also with express power -to pass all laws proper and
necessary to execute these powers. Among these are the right
to call for soldiers, and to impose taxes to carry on the operations
of the army and meet the general expenses of the war. Both
of these powers Congress had exercised before the passage of any
of these acts, and the question now is, can the state authorize a
taxation of the people for the same object? I do not doubt the
right of a state to raise money and men to defend herself from
invasion ; but this must be the real object, and not a pretext.
Casuists might argue that the defence of the state is involved in
the success of the national arms; for peradventure in case of failure, invasion might ensue as the result of that failure. But such

SPEER ET AL. vs. SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF BLAIRSVILLE.

685

meaning is inadmissible; it would justify state armies whenever
the necessity for a national army should exist, and thus endanger
the defeat of the federal authority altogether. Whenever a war
is waged by authority of Congress, and full power on the subject
by the national government has been exercised, I cannot comprehend the right of a state to interfere, except in case of actual
invasion; and then the interference must be for that purpose
primarily, and not secondarily, or as a consequence to flow from
want of success against the common enemy. The case of Houston
vs. Moore, determined by this court, and reported in 3 S. & R.
169, and affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States, 5
Wheat. 1, has been referred to for an opposite doctrine. This is
a mistake. The penalty inflicted by the court-martial in that
case was under a state law, copied, it is said, from an Act of
Congress ; but the action of the court-martial was sustained because the penalty was incurred for disobedience to the orders of
the state executive, and before the delinquent had entered the
service of the United States at all. The President had made a
requisition on the state for a portion of its militia, and, in the
process of furnishing it, the offence .was committed, and the soldier punished for disobedience to state orders before the federal
autholity attached. It was on this ground the case was decided
and affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States. But
the opinion of

WASHINGTON, J.,

describing a.case where Congress

has exercised authority, is very direct and in point in suppprt of
the position assumed by the counsel for the complainants. ;c If
in a specified case," says the judge, ",the people have thQugbt
proper to bestow certain powers on Congress as the safest depp~itary of them, and Congress has legislated within the scope of
them, the people have reason to complain that the same powers
should be exercised at tbxe same time by the state legislatures.
To subject them to the operation of two laws upon the same subject, dictated by distinct wills,.particularly in a case.inflicting
penalties, is, to my apprehension, something very like oppression.
In short, I am altogether incapable of comprehending how two
distinct wills can at the same time be exercised in relation to the
same subject, and be effectual and at the same time compatible
with each other. If they correspond in every respect, then the
latter is idle and inoperative; if they differ, they must, in the.
nature of things, oppose each other, so far as they do differ. If
one imposes a certain punishment for a certain offence, the pre-
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sumption is that this was deemed sufficient under all the circumstances, and the only proper one. If the other legislature impose
a different punishment in kind or degree, I am at a loss to conceive how they can both co-exist together."
.Nothing could more happily express the true idea of the position
than this, and goes far to prove its correctness. If Congress impose a tax which it deems sufficient for the war, the people must
obey, because they have ordained that the constitution of the
United States, and Acts of Congress passed under its authority,
shall be the supreme law of the land. This is their constitution
and their delegation of authority. Must they also obey another
supreme law emanating from the state on the same subject ? This
exercise of the war power was delegated to Congress, and not
reserved to the states or people. The people must submit to the
authority they have given Congress, but surely ought not to be
compelled to submit to a duplicate exaction by the state, much
less by every petty municipal authority that the legislature may
authorize to try its hand at taxation. Indeed, we once heard an
argument of the possibility of a state natV, under, it is true, the
idea of a defensive necessity. This idea seemed to me wrapped
up in a sophism, accidental no doubt, which, in its peculiar connection, was made to assert that defence is often best secured by
an offensive movement, and as the state is authorized to repel
invasion she may anticipate it, and send her navy and army
abroad to make the assault to prevent the anticipated invasion.
This would be good policy on part of a state retaining all its
rights and powers over peace and war, but not of a state in the
American Union. Such doctrines go far beyond my notion of
state rights; but are not at all irrelevant in arguing the point
assumed by the defendants.
The harmony of our complex, yet simple system of government,
is only to be preserved by a strict regard to the operation of its
parts, within their assigned limits. A disregard of this will bring,
and has brought on, collision between the parts, and will necessarily threaten the evils of discord and perhaps again war. The
error in what is contended for on part of the defendants, is in
mistaking the right of a state to repel invasion as a war power
in all its senses. It is so in a limited sense only; beyond that,
the government of the United States has charge and jurisdiction
of the mattei. A state cannot make war to prevent anticipated
invasion. This belongs alone to the Federal Government. The
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power of the state is by both federal and 'state constitutions confined ,to repelling invasion when it attempts to cross her borders.
This mischievous act and its confreres have resulted from the
error, that the Federal Government either possessed less power
than its foes, or the state more; and the interference by the ]at-.
ter, to put the best possible face on it, is to assist the former to
raise an army. The former, unfortunately, however, for the
exercise of authority by the latter, had fully exercised all the
powers it deemed necessary to the. end in view; this left the
latter without any right to interfere in any manner whatever.
This legislation, therefore, in my opinion, "can neither stand on
the right to find soldiers in relief of the enrolled 'citizen, nor in
the exercise of a war power by the state, not applicable to thb
case of invasion. Nothing like this was threatened at the time,
and there is iot the remotest reference in the act to the necessity
of soldiers for any such purpose.
These are my views of this momentous question; a question
involving a debt-large enough for a nation-to be borne if such
views are not to be held for law, by the people of a state burthened by a heavy state debt, by the extravagance of former
municipal subscriptiQns, and its full share of an enormous national
debt. The people.have always discharged their duty faithfully to
to state creditors and will do so; but it is grievous indeed, if they
are to be bound down by impositions against which they have en-,
deavored, most faithfully endeavored, but in vain, to provide a
protection. I am in favor of granting this injunction.
WOODWARD,

C. J., concurs.
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LOWELL HOLBROOK AND
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Where goods are sold by a vendor to a vendee transacting business at the same

place with himself, and no transit of the goods is contemplated between the
parties, and, by the contract of sale, the goods are to be delivered at fixed dates
on the receipt of the vendee's notes, on the delivery of the notes, the right of

stoppage in transitu does not exist.
It is immaterial that the goods are immediately put by the vendee upon their
transit to a distant place, or that the fact that they were to be so transmitted
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was known to the vendor, pr6vided that the transit was not named to the vendor
at the time of the contract.
Where goods are in bond for duties, they may be sold subject to the lien of the
United States. If the vendor consents to a withdrawal for transhipment, and
the vendee executes the customary bond for that purpose, the right of stoppage
in transitu can no longer be exercised by the vendor.
Even assuming that the right of stoppage in transitu continued as between
the vendor and the vendee, it is lost if the vendee assigns to an honest purchaser
a bill of lading of the goods given to himself on his own transhipment. If a loan
is made to the vendee on the faith of an assignment of the bill of lading, which
is executed several days after the loan, the delay being incidental to the transhipment, the loan is in contemplation of law made upon the bill of lading, and
the lender can claim the rights of a purchaser in good faith.
A., a foreign railroad corporation, having an office in Few York, and an executive committee with full power to transact its business, made a contract
through its committee with B., for the purchase of a large quantity of railroad
iron. The iron was to be delivered at a fixed time on the reception of the company's notes with certain collateral securities. The notes and securities having
been given accordingly, a part of the iron on shipboard in pori was withdrawn
from bond by B.'s consent, and a bond given by A. to the United States to secure
the payment of duties, as a condition of transhipment to Milwaukie. While the
transhipment was proceeding, A. borrowed money from C. on the faith of the
bill of lading. This was not executed until several days after the loan, owing
to the fact that the shipment was to be made on a number of vessels, and the
bill of lading was not to be executed until all the vessels were laden. The bill
of lading having been made out to A., and assigned by A. to C., Held, that on A.'s
insolvency B. could not exercise the right of stoppage in transitu.
B. having taken possession of the iron by a proceeding analogous to a writ of
replevin, held that he might be treated by C. as a trespasser.
It seems that the sureties in the replevin bond might also be treated as cotrespassers.

(Opinion of DAVIES, J., concludedfiom August Ymber.)

It will be instructive to refer to a few of the more prominent
cases, in which the right of stoppage has not been sustained, and
mainly on the ground that the transit was terminated: -Ellisvs.
Hunt, 3 Term Rep. 454; Mills vs. Ball, 2 Bos. & Pul. 456;
Shuhey vs. Heyward, 2 H. BI. 504; Wright vs. Lawes, 4 Esp.
82,; Foster vs. Frampton, 6 B. & C. 106; .Richardsonvs. Goss,
3 Bos. & Pul. 119 ; Scott vs. Pettit, Id. 469; Hammond vs.
Anderson, 4 Id. 68 ; -Dixon vs. Baldwin, 5 East 175; Leeds vs.

Wright, 3 Bos. & Pul. 320; Jralpy vs. Gibson, 4 M., G. & S. 857 ;
Bowe vs. Pickford, 8 Taunt. 83; Dodme vs. Wentworth, 4 M.
& G. 1080; Wentworth vs. Outhwaite, 10 M. & W. 436; 5awyer
vs. Joslin, 20 Verm. Rep. 172, 218 ; .Hayes vs. Monille, 14 Penn.

48; Briggs vs. Brury, 2 Curtis 0. C. 259; Bolin vs. Hoffnagle,

HOLBROOK vs. VOSE.

1 Rawle 9; Conyers vs. nEmmis, 2 Mann. 0. C. 286; Bunn vs.
Bowne, 2 Caine's Rep. 88.
All these cases will be found to be in harmony with the doctrine, that the vendor can stop the property only while it is in its
transit. If it has once reached the consignee there is an end of
all right to reclaim it, as a pledge for the payment of the purchase-money. That the transit referred to and understood in all
the cases, and in the elementary writers, is, that of the passing
over of the goods from the possession of the vendor to that of the
vendee, and that in no case has the right of stoppage in transitu
been attempted to be established, where the party setting up the
claim did not stand in the relation of consignor of the transit,
which he seeks to interrupt; and the consignor of the voyage
or transit interrupted, must occupy the position of vendor of the
goods consigned, and must be asserting his lien for the unpaid
purchase-money.
In Nunn vs. Bowne, one Foley purchased from one Rodman a
quantity of cotton, which then lay in Rodman's store, and had a
mark upon it. The cotton was sold on a credit of sixty days,
and Foley gave his note, having that time to run, for the amount
of the purchase. The cotton was not delivered, but continued in
the possession of Rodman. Foley informed the plaintiff's broker
that he had this cotton for sale, who, on account of plaintiffs,
called on Rodman and inquired for Foly's 'cotton, when this was
pointed out to him by a clerk as such, and after examination he
determined to purchase it for the plaintiffs from Foley, who, on
receiving the plaintiffs' notes for the full value, which had been
duly paid, gave an order on Rodman for the delivery of the cotton.' This order was not, however, immediately presented, nor
was Rodman, in whose possession the cotton was suffered to
remain, given any notice of the sale by Foley to plaintiffs. While
the cotton was in Rodman's possession, he placed it and Foley's
note in the hands of the defendant, as security for money loaned.
Foley having become bankrupt the day before his note fell due,
an agent of the plaintiffs presented to Rodman Foley's order, and
demanded a delivery of the cotton. This was refused, and trover
was brought to recover the twehty bales of cotton. The jury
found for the plaintiffs, and the court refused to set aside the verdict.
The case of Sawyer vs. Joslin, 20 Verm. Rep., is instructive
and interesting. It is-well considered, and the opinion of the
VOL. XIII.-44
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court is full, clear, and able. In that case the vendee was a merchant in Vergennes, aud had purchased goods in New York, which
were- forwarded to him, directed to him at Vergennes. They
arrived there, and were landed on the wharf of one Chapman,
and immediately attached by the creditors of the purchaser. The
plaintiff, the vendor, sought to exercise his right of stoppage in
tranaitu, and contended, that neither the arrival of the good at
the wharf, nor the landing them upon the wharf, terminated the
tranoitus, so as to divest the vendor of the right of stoppage in
trancitA.
HULL, J., in the opinion says: , The question in this case is,
whether the landing of the goods upon the wharf is to be considered as an actual or constructive delivery of them to Preston
(the vendee), within the doctrine of the adjudged cases on the
subject. I am unable to come to any other conclusion, than that
it was such a delivery." * * "When the goods were landed
on the wharf, the result of the original impulse impressed upon
"them by the vendor, in transmitting them to the vendee, was
secomplished. They would go no further under that impulse."
"Thelearned judge then proceeded to an accurate classification
of all the cases relied on, when the transit had not terminated,
auA which he thinks will be found to fall within one or the other
of &e following classes.
J. Cases in which it has been held, that the right of stoppage
existed, when the goods were originally forwarded on board of a
ship -chartered by the vendee.
2. When the delivery of the goods to the vendee has been
deemed incomplete, by reason of his refusal to accept them.
3. When goods remained in the custom-house, subject to a
government bill for duties.
4. Wken they were still in the hands of the carrier, or wharfinger as his agent, subject to the carrier's lien for freights.
6. When the goods, though arrived at their port of delivery,
were still on shipboard, or in the hands of the ships' lighter-man
to be conveyed to the wharf.
6. When the goods had performed part of their transit, but
were in the hands of a middle-man, to be forwarded on by other
carriers.
In the ease now under consideration, Vose, Livingston & Co.,
the parties seeking to break up this transit, did not set it in motion. They are not the consignors of this iron. When it was
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delivered by them to the railroad company in the city of New
York, it was that company that set on foot the transportation of
the iron to Milwaukie. They consigned it to Johnson, their
consignee, and not the consignee of Vose, Livingston & Co. The
railroad company were the consignors, and Vose, Livingston &
Co., in reference to this voyage or transit, stood in no such attitude as that of consignors. They were, it is true, the creditors
of the railroad company, but as to this particular property, it
was in the possession and under the control of the company or its
agents, they having been invested by the former owners with the
full title to it, and the actual and absolute possession of it. They
therefore had the entire control of it, and could have given it
such destination as they saw fit; and no right of stoppage, in the
transit of this iron from the city of New York to Milwaukee,
could be exercised, or availed of by Vose, Livingston & Co.
But if I am mistaken in the views thus expressed, and which
seem to me to be sustained by all the authorities, it appears to me
that the plaintiffs are the hondfide owners of this iron, certainly to
the extent of their advance, made by them on the faith of the transfer to them. Placing the case most strongly for Vose, Livingston
& Co., they had but a lien for the unpaid purchase-money. They
gave the railroad company the possession and evidences of ownership of the iron, and with these enabled them to go into the market and obtain money on the faith of such ownership.
The broad und general principle is constantly recognised, that
wherever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of
a third, he, who has enabled such third person to occasion the
loss, must sustain it. (Per ASHHURST, J., in Lickbarrow vs.
Mason, 2 T. R. 70.) It is conceded, as I understand it, and
there can certainly be no doubt of the proposition, that if the
plaintiffs made the advances on the bill of lading of this iron,
their equity is superior to that of Vose, Livingston & Co., even
if they were consignors of the iron on this particular transit, and
stood in the position to exercise the right of stoppage in transitu.
We have already seen, that it is a well-settled rule, that the rights
of the seller cannot be exercised to the prejudice of any third
party, who bondfide has received from the buyer a transference
by bill of lading or other negotiable instrument, of the property
purchased from him by his vendee. This is distinctly affirmed in
the leading case of Liokbarrow vs. Mason, 2 T. R. 63. But is the
case altered from the circumstance, that the bill of lading was not
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actually received by the plaintiffs until the 22d of July ? On the
10th of July they made the advance, on the faith of the promise
to deliver the bill of lading as soon as it could be furnished, and
which could not be done until the entire cargo or shipment of iron
was on board the boats of the Troy and Oswego Line: and,
also, on the faith of the bill of parcels, receipted by Vose, Livingston & Co., the authority of the company to its executive committee to make the loan: the assignment and transfer of the iron
to the plaintiffs, and the order of the company on Johnson, the
consignee of the iron, to deliver the iron to the plaintiffs' order,
which, at the time of the advance, were deposited with them. It
is. said, that the paper executed and delivered to the plaintiffs
on the 22d of July, was not a bill of lading. It is true that it
is not in the form usually adopted in framing papers of that description, but it possesses all the legal requisites of a bill of
lading, and confers the same rights as a more formal paper would
have done: Jacobs's Law Die., tit. Bill of Lading; Lichbarrow
vs. Mason, 2 T. R. 75, per BULLER, J.; .Dows vs. .Perrine,18 N.
Y. 325, 328; Dows vs. Rush, 28 Barb. 157, &c.; Bank of Bochesder vs. Jones, 4 Coins. 497; Davis vs. Greene, 16 Barb. 72.
At the time of the advance, therefore, it was made as well on the
faith of the bill of lading as of the other papers. It is true, the
bill was not then in existence, but when it was, and was delivered,
it must be deemed to have relation to the date, it was to have
been given, and on the faith of which the plaintiffs acted. Especially should this be done in the present case, as no rights of
others intervened in the meanwhile. It seems to me, that the
reasoning of Chief Justice SHAW, in Rowley vs. Bigelow, supra,
is quite apposite and satisfactory on this point.
In that case the plaintiffs claimed to hold the corn as bond fide
holders of the bill of lading, which had been transferred to them,
and upon which they had made advances. The bill of lading
was dated and issued on the 17th May 1830, and the advance
was made on the 20th. The bill of lading was issued by a captain of a vessel lying in the port of New York, on the 25th of
May, the day the corn was actually put on board. The plaintiffs
claimed to stop. in its transit, the corn represented by the bill,
and the defendants claimed to hold the same, as having advanced
thereon in good faith. The claim of the defendants was sustained
by the court. Chief Justice SHAW, in delivering the opinion
of the court, remarked, " That it was contended that the defend-
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ants were not purchasers for a valuable consideration aid 6aod
fide, so as to be entitled to the benefit of thd exception in their
favor.. But we are of the opinion that They do stand in that
relation, and are entitled to the benefit of it. The ground upon
which the plaintiffs rely is, that at the time the bill of lading was
signed, the corn was not on board; and in fact, as appears by a
comparison of dates, had not been purchased. A bill of lading
is a contract of carriage for hire, by.which the master engages
to deliver the goods to the shipper, or his order, and so is quasinegotiable. It operates by way of estoppel against master, and
also against the shipper and indorsee. The bill of lading acknowledges the goods to be on board, and, regularly, the goods ought
to be on board before the bill of lading-is signed. But if, through
inadvertence or otherwise, the bill of lading is signed before the
goods are on board, upon the faith and assurance that they are at
hand, as, if they are received on the wharf ready to be shipped,
or in the shipowner's warehouse, or in the shipper's own warehouse at hand and ready, and afterwards they are placed on
board as and for the goods embraced in the bill of lading, as
against the shipper and master, the bill of lading would operate
on the goods by way of relation and by estoppel." It was asked
how long after the signature to the bill might the property be
placed on board so as to be bound by it, and to become the subject upon which it shall operate. The court thought this might
be done at any time whilst the vessel was taking in her cargo for
the "voyage described in the bill and before she sails upon it. The
court say : ,It can make no difference to the plaintiffs whether
the bill of lading was signed after this shipment or a few days
before, in anticipation of such shipment. Supposing, then, that
when the goods were shipped as against th4 shipper and master,
the bill of lading operated upon this property, and would have
bound the owner and master to deliver it to the consignee, as we
think it would, then, by the uniform course and practice of merchants, the bill of lading represents the property, and any bond
fide title for valuable consideration obtained by'a transmission or
negotiation of the bill of lading, is as valid and effectual a title
to the goods as could be obtained by an actual delivery of the
goods themselves. The defendants have shown such a title,
and must have judgment." In the case now under consideration,
the shipment of the iron commenced on the 10th of July, the
date of the advance, and the whole was put on board before the
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22d. The reason for not obtaining the bill earlier is stated. The
iron had to go in different boats, and the bill could not be given
until the entire parcel was delivered on board, and it would then
cover the whole. As soon as it was all on the boats the bill of
lading was executed and delivered to the plaintiffs according to
the agreement, and upon the faith and assurance of which they
made the advance. It is difficult to see what difference it makes
to Vose, Livingston & Co., as they had not in the mean time
acquired any new rights, nor had any change then taken place
in the affairs of the company which at all affected them. I come
to the conclusion, therefore, that the plaintiffs became as effectually
bond fide holders of the bill, by its receipt by them on the 22d
of July, in pursuance of the agreement made on the 10th to give
it, as they would have been if it had been delivered to them on
the 10th, at the time they made the advance. But if this be not
so, it seems to me that the case of Hunn vs. Bowne (supra), 2
Caines 38, is quite in point, and that the facts to conititute the
plaintiffs bond fide holders are even stronger in the present case
than in that. It will be recollected that in that case Rodman
obtained the possession of the cotton. On the call of the purchaser at Rodman's store, he inquired for Foley's cotton, and a
clerk then pointed it out, after which it was purchased of Foley;
and, on giving notes to him for the amount of the purchase, Foley
gave a delivery-order on Rodman. The Supreme Court held plaintiffs to be bond fide purchasers, and that their equity was superior to
that of the original owner who claimed the right to stop in transitu.
THOmPSOn, J., in the opinion, says: , The right of the vendor
to stop goods in transitu, in case of insolvency of the vendee, is
a kind of equitable lien, adopted by the law for the purpose of
attaining substantial justice. As the plaintiffs in this case have
paid a valuable consideration for the goods, and there is no color
for imputing to them fraud or notice of any pretended lien of
Rodman, the finding of the jury for plaintiffs was right." He
cites, with approval, the case of Lempriere vs. Pasley, 2 T. R.
490. LIvIxGSToN, J., said: " When the rights of a fair purchaser intervene, the doctrine of stopping goods in transitu,
which has been carried far enough, ought not to be strained in
favor of the vendor, or as in the case here, in favor of a creditor
of the vendor to whom they were first pledged." The acts of Vose,
Livingston & Co., who setup and seek to avail themselves of a
prior lien, to the detriment of a bond fide purchaser, are far more
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significant and conclusive against them, than the acts of Rodman.
In this case they gave the company all the indicia of title, and
put them in possession not only of the highest evidence of title to
personal property, but the property itself; and declared in writing, signed by them, that the company were such owners, and that
they had paid them for the property. Can they now be permitted,
after they have induced these plaintiffs to part with their money on
the faith of the truth of'their statements, to deny themi and set
up a prior lien on the same property ? I think not. Lempriere
vs. Pasley, supra, is worthy of consideration, as it decides the
precise points of the effect of the transfer of a bill of lading, at
a subsequent date from the time it was agreed to make the transfer. One Syeds, in consideration of an advance to him by one
Pasley, the defendant, transferred and assigned to him certain
brazillettos, then on board a ship at sea, and agreed, " as soon as
the bill of lading for the same is transmitted to me, to indorse
and deliver the same over to the defendant." The bill of lading
arriving some months after, but not until Syeds had committed
an act of bankruptcy, he assigned it to the defendant, pursuant
to his agreement. The counsel for the defendant contended, that
the indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading will vest the
legal property in -the defendant, as of the date of the agreement
to do so, and citing many analogous cases. The court fully sustained this view. ASHHURST, J., says: ",As between a person
who has an equitable lien, and a third person who purchases the
thing for a valuable consideration, and without. notice, the prior
equitable lien shall not overreach the title tf thq vendee." The
plaintiffs must, therefore, be regarded as having the same rights,
as they would have, if the bill of lading had been assigned to
them on the 10th of July, at the time the advance was made by
them, and then delivered to them. It results from these views,
that the plaintiffs, on this ground, were entitled to the property
covered by the bill of lading, and the taking it from the possession of their agents by the defendants was a trespass, for which
they are liable for the damages sustained.
Another question is presented: Whether the defendants, Brown
and Dawson, the sureties to the sheriff in the undertaking, are
also liable. It must be conceded, that without their aid and cooperation, the trespass would not and could not have been committed. We are to assume that the sheriff would not, in violation
of law, have taken the plaintiffs' property, unless such an obligation
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had been made and executed by the defendants. In assuming it
does it not follow that they took upon themselves all the consequences resulting from their act?
The admitted rule of law is, that all who aid, command, advise,
or countenance the commission of a tort by another, are liable in
the same manner as if they had done the same tort with their
own hands: -Emillevs. Swann, 19 Johns. 881; Morgan vs.
Varick, 8 Wend. 587; Coats vs. Darby, 2 Corns. 517; Judson
w. Cook, 11 Barb. 642.
In Emille vs. Swanm, supra, Ch. J. SPENCER says: "When
au immediate act is done, by. the co-operation of the joint act of
several persons, they are all trespassers, and may be sued jointly
or severally, and any one of them is liable for the injury done
by all. To render one man liable in trespass for the acts of
others, it must appear, either that they acted in concert, or that
the act of the individual sought to be charged, ordinarily and
naturally produced the acts of the others." In Mbrgan vs.
T-arick, supra, Ch. J. SAVAGE says: "cThe defendant, Yarick,
by requesting Leavenworth to remove the property, became a
party to the trespass, and is liable in this -action. Any unwarrantable and unauthorited -interference with the property of
another, is sufficient to constitute the party a trespasser."
In the present -case the defendants, Vose, Livingston & Perkins, upon the views expressed, wereclearl.y espassers in taking
and seizing the property of these plaintiltR 'That trespass was
committed through the instrumentality 6f the sheriff of the county
of Oswego, and the nAans employed, were -a suit for the claim
and delivery of personal property under thW Code. Livingston,
one of the defendants, had made the affidavits required by the
Code, that the personal -property therein mentioned, belonged to
the firm of Vose, Livingston & Co., and that it was wrongfully
detained from them by the railroad company, and by the carriers
employed by the company to transport it. Thereupon Vose,
Livingston & Perkins, by their attorneys, made a requisition upon
the sheriff of Oswego, to take the property mentioned in the affidavit and deliver it to them. The sheriff could not lawfully comply with this demand without the execution and delivery to him
of the undertaking required by the Code, and it may be assumed,
that he refused to take and deliver the property, without the execution and delivery of such undertaking. Thereupon, the defendants .Brown and Dawson intervene, and executte and deliver the
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undertaking, without which, it is clear, the sheriff would not, as
he could not lawfully, take and deliver the property. They say,
whereas the plaintiffs, Vose, Livingston & Perkins, have made
the affidavit referred to, and claim the immediate delivery to
them of the said property, in consideration of such taking by
such sheriff by virtue of such affidavit and requisition, they
undertake and become bound for the prosecution of such suit,
and for a return of said property if a return thereof shall be
adjudged.. The act of taking the plaintiffs' property was done
by the co-operation of the defendants Brown and Dawson with
the other defendants, and upon the authority of the cases
cited it was their joint act, and rendered them all trespassers. The execution and delivery of the undertaking was, ih
effect, a request by all those executing it, to the sheriff, to take
this. particular property, and deliver it to the plaintiffs, in that
proceeding. In Root vs. Chandler, 10 Wend. 111, the defendant
was a creditor of one Rice, against whom an execution had been
issued, and the constable holding it had taken his horses. A
number of persons creditors of Rice had a'meeting, of which the
defendant was.one, and after consultation had, the constable was
directea to retain the horses. The defendant was held to be a
trespasser. Oh. J. SAVAGE, in the opinion says: "I think,
thereupon, the jury were justified in finding the defendant guilty
of. taking the property. It is clear, that but for the interference
Pf the defendant and the*others, the plaintiff would not have been
deprived of his property." It is equally clear in the present
case, that but for the interference of the signers to the undertaking, the present plaintiffs would not have been deprived of their
property. In Davis vs. N'ewklirk, 5 Denio 92, the defendants
Broker and Jute had united with the defendant Newkirk in a
bond of indemnity to the sheriff, who had levied bn certain property of defendants, in an execution in favor of and issued by
Newkirk. The bond of indemnity was given by them to the sheriff
before the sale, by which they engaged to save him harmless for
levying upon and selling the lumber on Newkirk's execution.
The defendants moved at the trial, that Broker and Jute should
be discharged, on the ground that there was no evidence against
them. It was contended on their behalf, that their signing the
bond of indemnity to the sheriff did not make them wrongdoers.
The court, by BEARDSLEY, 0. J., held, that the judge was correct
in refusing to discharge the defendants Broker and Jute. They
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had signed a bond by which they engaged to indemnify the sheriff
for levying upon and selling this lumber on the execution, in
favor of their co-defendant in this suit, Newkirk. It was in consequence of receiving this bond that the sheriff proceeded to
make the levy and sale, and if that was wrongful, then defendants were responsible therefor. The bond contemplated such a
seizure and sale, and it was a virtual request to the sheriff to proceed accordingly. What the sheriff did was therefore, in effect,
done under the direction, and with the advice and concurrence of
these defendants, and for which they are as much responsible as
the sheriff would be. All who direct, request, or advise all act
to be done, which is wrongful, are themselves wrongdoers, and
responsible for all damages. Giving th6 bond of indemnity was
alone sufficient to carry the case to the jury on this point."
The doctrine of these cases has received the approval of this
court in the case of Herring vs. ifopock, 15 N. Y. Rep. 409.
In this case a sheriff had levied on a safe claimed to "belong to
the plaintiff, under an execution against Brooks & Hopkins, in
whose possession it was. The defendant Hoppock, as surety with
one Jackson as principal, the plaintiff in the execution, signed a
bond to the sheriff, indemnifying him for leving upon and selling
said safe ; and the serious question in the case was as to the
liability of the surety on the bond as a wrongdoer. Mr. Justice
PAIGE laid down the rule correctly as to the liability of all cooperating in the trespass. "The indemnitors were the causa
causans, inducing and requesting the sheriff to do the wrongful
act. Their indemnity naturally produced the act of the wrongful sale, and must be regarded as the principal if not the sole
cause of it. All persons who direct or request another to commit
a trespass, are liable as co-trespassers. The bonds of indemnity
in this case were a virtual request to the sheriff to sell the safe,
and the act of the sale waS, in effect, done under the direction
and with the advice and concurrence of the obligors in the bonds,
and they are therefore equally liable with the sheriff to the plaintiff as trespassers." COMSTOCK, J., says: "The defendant was
an iidemnitor as surety for Jackson, the plaintiff therein, and on
that execution the safe was actually sold." On this ground, he
was of the opinion that the defendant was liable. He adds: "It
is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a distinction between
the principal and the surety in such a bond. All the parties,
without regard to their relation to each other, are in judgment
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of law aiding, abetting, and requesting the sale." Ford vs. Williams, 3 Ken. 577, has been urged upon us as an authority for a
different rule. We do not so understand it. In that case the
defendant was an attorney, and on the proofs there presented took
no part personally in the levy or sale. He but communicated to
the sheriff the instructions of his principals, and signed the bond
of indemnity, not as surety for them, but as their agent and
attorney. It was their bond, and not his. DENIO, 0. J., laid
down the rule, as we understand it, that all who aid and abet the
commission of a trespass are liable jointly or severally at the
election of the party entitled to the action." He further says:
c But when one acts only in the execution of the duties of his calling or profession and does not go beyond it, and does not actually
participate in the trespass, he is not liable, though what he does may
aid another party in its commission." It is sought to bring the
sureties, in the undertaking in the present case, within the rule
thus laid down. But a moment's reflection will show that the
cases have no analogy. Here the act of the sureties in signing and delivering the undertaking were not in the execution of
any duty of their profession or calling. They were volunteers
to the plaintiffs in the replevin suit, to aid them in taking the
property of these present plaintiffs. We have seen that it could
not have been legally done without their co-operation or of some
other sureties, and we are to assume that it would not have been
done without such aid and co-operation. They therefore directly
aided in the commission of the trespass in the present case, and
-wecan make no distinction between the parties, the principals and
the sureties. They all aided, abetted, and requested the taking
of the property, and if any are liable as trespassers, all are, without any reference or regard to the relation they stand in to each
other.
It can make no difference, as to the liability, whether the act
of co-operation be found.in the execution of a bond of indemnity, an undertaking under the Code, or any other act bnanifesting
co-operation, aid, or other complicity in the trespass. The only
question is, Did the party who is sought to be charged aid, abet,
request, or co-operate in the trespass? If he did, he is responsible, without reference to the particular manner or form in which
he manifested such participation. We think all the parties to
this undertaking were participators to the trespass, and in judgment of law were aiding, abetting, and requesting the seizure,
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and equally liable, jointly or severally, for the damage which the
plaintiffs have sustained.
The judgment of the Superior Court must be reversed,
and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.
The following judges concurred in this opinion:

WRIGHT,

GOULD, W. F. ALLEN, SUTHERLAND, and' E. D. SMITH, except

upon the last point discussed, the liability of the sureties, WRIGHT
and SUTHERLAND did not concur. DENIO, 0. J., read an opinion
for affirmance, SELDEN, J., not voting. Five judges not concurring on the liability of the sureties, a re-argument was ordered
upon that branch of the case, which was subsequently settled.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, at Misi Prius.
COMMONWEALTH EX REL. W. B. N.

COZZENS VS. H.

A.

FRINK.

The rebellion being ended, the authority of the President under the Act of 3d
March 1863,
1, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, has
expired.

Haleas corpus before THOMPSON, J.

The relator, Cozzens, having been tried by court-martial for
frauds in connection with contracts for furnishing supplies to the
War Department, and the proceedings having been transmitted to
the department, was arrested by the provost-marshal, whereupon
he sued out this writ.
The return was as follows:TO THE

HON. JAmES THOmPSON, JUDGE OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

The undersigned, one of the respondents in the within writ, respectfully
makes return thereto, that the relator, WV.B. N. Cozzens, was on the 29th
June, inst., arrested by order of this respondent, and is now detained by him
as a prisoner, under the authority of the President of the United States, and
that the other respondents mentioned in said writ are officers and clerks under'
the command of this respondent; and further saith not.
H. A. FRINK,
Colonel and Provost-Marshal of Philadelphia.1
1

As a portion of this case it may be stated, that the above return of the pro-

vost-marshal not having been made at the time named in the writ, an attachment
for contempt was issued against him, upon which lie came into court and made
return as above. On the attachment, he was fined $10 for contempt.
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July 5th 1865, the following opinion was delivered by
THOMPSON, J.-This return is partly in accordance with the
Act of Congress of the 3d of March 1863, § 1, that whenever
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be suspended by
the President under the authority of the act; no military or other
officer shall be compelled in answer to any writ of habeas corpus
to return the body of any person detained by him by authority of
the President, but upon the certificate under oath of the officer
that the prisoner is detained under and by authority of the President, further proceedings under the writ shall be suspended by
the judge or court having issued it. This section authorizes the
President " during the present rebellion," whenever and wherever
in his judgment the public safety may require it, to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and it is provided, that
"csaid suspension by the President shall remain in force so long
as said rebellion shall continue."
On this return the important question is, whether on the 29th
of June last the rebellion continued or not.
This is a fact to be judicially determined like any other fact.
It is not for the President only, by proclamation to determine
this. He is not authorized to fix the status of the country on
this point by the Act of Congress. The power of suspension depends on the fact of rebellion and its continuance. It ceases
with the rebellion, and that fact is as much within judicial cognisance as is any fact under which rights exist and are held. As
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a constitutional right
of every citizen, we are bound to observe a strict construction of
every act which threatens to deprive him of it.
We have here an expression of legislative intent, which is plain
that the suspension of the privilege of the writ is only to continue
during the rebellion. When that ceases, the right of the President to continue the suspension ceases, and courts are bound to
give to the citizen his rights under the privilege. There is nothing
prescribed as to what shall be the evidence of it. It is, therefore, to be ascertained like any other fact, by evidence appropriate to such a fact.
There is abundant evidence in the current history of the times
that the rebellion no longer continues. We know its organization
is entirely destroyed, its armies captured or surrendered, its officers imprisoned or paroled. In addition, we know that our own
armies are being as rapidly mustered out as possible. The returning
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soldiers crowd our streets daily, and we cease to look for battles and
victories, as events as little to be expected as before rebellion commenced. There is not a single known body of men in arms anywhere under the once well-known organization called the " Confederate States of America." It is completely obliterated with
all its forces. Civil government has been set up in all the rebellious states but one, and trade opened by the proclamation of the
President, with scarcely any restriction. Every fort, navy yard,
and port is again under the government and entire control of the
United States; and war has ceased everywhere in the land. The
time has arrived, therefore, when a return to the enjoyment of
civil rights, under civil government, must take place, and when
by express limitation the suspension of the habeas corpus should
cease.
This being so, the authority of the President (waiving all other
considerations at this time), without more, is not a sufficient warrant for the arrest of a citizen.
"No warrant shall issue" for the arrest of any person "but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation."- Constitution of the United States.
,No warrant to search places or to seize any person or thing
shall issue without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation."-Oonstitutionof Pennsylvania.
There being no oath here charging a crime or offence and a
warrant to authorize an arrest, the arrest is therefore unauthorized, and the prisoner is entitled to be discharged.
In this decision no conflict ought to be felt to exist between
the civil and military authority. It is an important clause of our
Bill of Rights, 4c that the military shall, in all cases, and at all
times, be in strict subordination to the civil power ;" and it will
doubtless be as agreeable to the military authorities that there
should be a return to the normal condition of the country, since
happily, peace reigns, as it is to the civil authority ; -no other
legal condition can possibly exist now. On this return, therefore,
I must discharge the prisoner.
I can base nothing on the argument that the prisoner is arrested
because there has been a trial before a military tribunal about
something, of the nature of which I am not informed, and that the
presumption of his conviction occasions his arrest. All this is
ultra the return, and need not be noticed.
Prisoner discharged.

